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Abstract
This dissertation examines the effects of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)
on shareholder wealth, corporate control, and insider trading.

In the first o f three

essays, a revision of the asymmetric information hypothesis is applied to the securities
issuance structure o f the ESOP to provide an explanation o f the ESOP announcement’s
effect on shareholder wealth. Essay two examines the effects o f the firm ’s (and its state
of incorporation’s) supermajority provisions, level of pre- and post-announcement
managerial voting power, and takeover "attractiveness" on the announcement-day
reaction. The final essay examines the managers’ insider trading activities around the
announcement o f the ESOP.
The first essay provides evidence that for announcements made in the absence of
takeover activity, the market’s reaction to ESOPs partially structured with previously
unissued common stock and convertible preferred equity is significantly and positively
affected by the presence of a simultaneous repurchase announcement. In contrast, a
similar analysis of ESOPs announced without a simultaneous repurchase finds an
insignificant market reaction to ESOPs structured with common stock and a weakly
significant and negative reaction to ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity.
This finding is supportive o f the revised asymmetric information hypothesis.
The results o f the second essay suggest that the market discriminates between firms
that are attractive and unattractive for takeover. A significant negative market reaction
is observed when the "attractive" firms announce an ESOP that increases the managers’

ix
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voting power from a low to high level o f entrenchment.

In contrast, insignificant

results are found in a similar "low-to-high" examination o f unattractive firms.
The final essay examines the managers’ insider trading activities around the
announcement o f the ESOP and argues that these trading activities are related to the
structure o f the ESOP. Insiders significantly reduce the number, and dollar value, of
their shares sold in the months immediately surrounding the announcement o f ESOPs
structured with repurchased equity. Similar results are noted for the sample o f ESOPs
that experience a significant positive announcement-day reaction.
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Chapter 1
An Overview

1.1. Introduction
This dissertation examines the shareholder wealth effects o f an announced employee
stock ownership plan (ESOP) within three separate frameworks based on a revision of
the asymmetric information hypothesis, insider ownership, and insider trading activities.
Though an ESOP is regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act o f 1974
(ERISA), there are many features that distinguish it from other ERISA-governed
pension plans.
First, ESOPs are established as separate legal entities and therefore allowed to
borrow from sources outside the firm.

Non-ESOP pensions do not have similar

borrowing potential and are not a source o f financing to the firm.

Second, these

borrowed funds are used to purchase large blocks o f the firm ’s convertible preferred
equity and common stock. In contrast, ERISA limits the investments o f a non-ESOP
pension plan to a small percentage of the firm’s equity. Consequently, a firm ’s capital
structure is effectively, perhaps materially, altered by the establishment o f an ESO P.1
The securities issuance structure of the ESOP and the corresponding information
inferred by the market is the subject o f the first essay o f this dissertation (chapter 3).
Third, because of the potentially large purchase of equity, the ESOP is likely to
have a material effect on the voting power structure of the firm, a characteristic of

'In relation to a firm ’s capital structure, the ESOP trust’s debt is typically guaranteed by the firm and
therefore recorded as a balance sheet liability. M oreover, the equity securities purchased by the ESOP
are frequently used as collateral on the loan.

1
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material concern to managers o f firms with a non-zero probability o f experiencing a
takeover. The second essay (chapter 4) examines the relationship between the market’s
announcement-day reaction and the change in voting power attributed to the ESOP.
Finally, by assuming that ESOPs increase a firm’s managerial voting power, one
question that arises is, "Does this change in voting power have an effect on
management’s personal ownership in the firm?" To address this question, the third
essay (chapter 5) analyzes the trading patterns of managers (insiders) in the stock o f
their firm around the announcement o f the ESOP.

1.2. The Security Issuance Structure
The first essay (chapter 3) is based on the fact that the during the ESOP formation
process, the number o f available ESOP structures is large.

The ESOP may borrow

from the firm or a private institution and use these funds to purchase common stock and
convertible preferred shares directly from the firm, privately, or in the open market.
An ESOP can therefore be thought of as an alternative source of capital to the firm.
Thus, Myers and M ajluf’s (1984) asymmetric information theory o f securities issuance2
is applicable to the establishment and expansion of an ESOP. Given the variety of
ESOP-related security issuances, and assuming that the market believes that the
managers have superior knowledge about the firm’s future cash flows, the relevant
question is whether differing ESOP structures alter the market’s perception o f the value
o f the firm.

2Myers and M ajluPs asymmetric information argument is that the issuance o f equity securities is
viewed by the market as negative information. Management’s choice o f equity implies the stock is
overvalued based on the presumed inside information about the true state o f the firm. Empirical evidence
(Smith, 1986) is consistent with this hypothesis.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3

With the added assumption that managers act in the best interest o f the firm ’s
current shareholders and employees, the first essay argues that the market’s perception
o f firm value in response to an ESOP should differ from that formed during the
announcement o f a comparable non-ESOP equity issue. Unlike their situation in a nonESOP issue, the firm’s employees are directly affected by an ESOP-related security
issue. Funding an ESOP with an overpriced security is likely to be detrimental to the
employees’ and the firm’s performance, and thus to the manager’s job security. Essay
one is, therefore, a modified application o f Myers and M ajluf’s theory on the issuance
o f securities in an asymmetric information environment.
The results o f the examination of ESOPs established and expanded in the 1980-1993
period support an asymmetric information explanation of the market’s reaction to
ESOPs announced in the absence of takeover activity. Moreover, ESOPs structured
with repurchased equity appear to have an overriding positive effect on the market’s
reaction to various ESOP structures.

Finally, ESOPs announced in the presence of

takeover activity have a significant negative effect (on average) on firm value.

1.3. Voting Power
Chapter 4 (essay two) is based on the assumption that the holders of the ESOP
shares (i.e., the trustee and employees) will generally vote with management if a hostile
takeover arises.

Therefore, ESOPs presumably have an effect on managerial voting

power and the market for corporate control. The second essay employs three analytical
improvements over prior insider ownership/corporate control research to gain additional
insight into the relation between ESOPs and corporate control. First, in this analysis
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the insider ownership variable o f concern will account for the supermajority provisions
that differ by the state of incorporation and corporate bylaws. Prior insider ownership
research implicitly assumes that a firm with a given level of insider ownership has the
same degree o f takeover protection (i.e., entrenchment) irrespective o f a supermajority
provision. Based on the significant negative market reaction to the announcement of
a supermajority amendment (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987, and Karpoff and
Malatesta, 1989), the implicit assumption appears to be inaccurate.
A second improvement over prior corporate control research is to recognize
explicitly that the effect o f insider ownership on the probability o f a takeover, and
therefore on the value o f the firm , differs by the degree o f takeover "attractiveness" that
a firm possesses. For example, a firm with an excessively high level o f debt, low cash
flow, and stagnant growth (i.e., an unattractive firm) is likely to have a very low
probability o f being taken over regardless of the change in voting ownership caused by
the ESOP. Changes in firm value caused by an ESOP-related increase in insider voting
power should therefore be smaller for unattractive firms, all else equal. Past insider
ownership/corporate control research has implicitly assumed that all firms are equally
attractive targets, and therefore that the "probability o f takeover" changes as the level
of insider voting power changes.
The final difference in approach in the second essay is the incorporation of pre- and
post-announcement levels of voting power controlled by management.

It is

hypothesized that firms with a low level o f managerial voting power prior to the ESOP
will experience a positive (negative) market reaction if the post level o f voting power
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remains "low" (is changed to "high").

The management entrenchment hypothesis

predicts the negative market reaction because management has reached a level o f voting
power that can eliminate all takeover threats and associated premiums. Conversely, the
shareholder interests hypothesis asserts that the positive reaction is expected because
management, unable to entrench themselves, will use the added (ESOP) voting power
to negotiate a higher premium if a takeover is attempted.

In contrast, past ESOP

research has predominantly focused on the pre-announcement level of insider
ownership, resulting in a prediction that firms with a low level o f insider ownership
prior to the ESOP will experience a positive market reaction, regardless o f the post
announcement level o f insider power.
The second essay incorporates these three elements into a regression o f the firms’
cumulative prediction errors onto varying ownership variables to determine whether the
hypothesized shareholder interests and management entrenchment effects differ between
ESOP firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover.

The regression

differentiates firms by their levels of pre- and post-announcement insider ownership,
and accounts for the differences in managerial voting power caused by a supermajority
provision.

The importance of this analysis extends beyond ESOPs, with potential

application to the examination o f other financial events that affect a firm ’s value via a
change in insider ownership (managerial voting power).
The results o f essay two (chapter 4) support the argument that the market
discriminates between ESOP firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover. The
findings also support the hypothesis that the post-announcement level o f ownership has
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a significant effect on the prediction error outcome.

That is, for the sample of

attractive ESOP firms, the results suggest that the market negatively reacts to ESOPs
announced by firms that increase their level of managerial voting power from "low" to
"high."

Insignificant outcomes are found for a similar low-to-high analysis of

unattractive firms,

1.4. Insider Trading Activities
The final essay (chapter 5) examines the managers’ ("insiders’") trading activities
in the stock of their firm around the announcement o f an ESOP.

In addition to

examining the trades that affect the managers’ personal wealth in an environment of
(assumed) asymmetric information and SEC regulation, the insiders’ trading activities
can also be used as a proxy for the firm ’s private information. In this sense, further
evidence is provided relevant to the asymmetric information hypotheses noted in the
first essay.
The examination of insider trading activities around the ESOP announcement is also
connected to the analyses outlined in the second essay. This association is based on the
notion that an increase in voting power from the ESOP formation allows management
to reduce its level o f personal (cash-flow) ownership in the firm without reducing the
effective level of entrenchment.

Furthermore, differing insider trading activities are

predicted for managers of attractive and unattractive firms.

To be specific, the

managers o f unattractive firms are hypothesized to have a smaller concern for their
level of voting ownership and therefore have an opportunity to participate in a larger
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sell-off o f personal shares without a material increase in the probability o f a takeover
or a decrease in job security.
Finally, assuming that the managers are relatively aware o f the market’s
forthcoming reaction to the ESOP announcement, the analysis o f their trading activities
indicates whether they are engaging in personal wealth maximization. For example,
a significant insider net sell-off is expected prior to the announcement o f an ESOP
associated with a negative market reaction. The sell-off is therefore made at a price
that is subsequently revealed to the market to be excessive, and the insider has avoided
a decrease in personal wealth. This analysis also provides cursory evidence about the
SEC trading penalties’ effects on insider trading.3

A more sanguine argument

consistent with this prediction is provided by John and M ishra’s (1990) signalling
model, which suggests that the insiders’ trading activities and the firm ’s announcement
act as a joint signal to the market. Regardless, the point to be made is that there is a
hypothesized correlation between the insider trading activities and the direction of the
stock price reaction.
The findings detailed in chapter 5 show that for ESOPs structured with repurchased
equity, the net number (and net dollar value) o f shares sold by the firms’ managers is
significantly lower during the immediate months surrounding the announcement.
Similar results are found for ESOP firms that experienced a significant positive
prediction error.

-The purpose o f the analysis is to test for an association between the insiders’ trading activities and
the m arket’s reaction to the ESOP announcement.
It is not meant to test for (or imply) an
unethical/illegal insider trading activity.
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The next chapter provides background information and a review o f the literature
that addresses the areas often cited as the reasons for establishing an ESOP:
benefits;

2) employee motivation; and 3) corporate control implications.

1) tax

A fourth

explanation in the literature, but not discussed here, is the establishment of an ESOP
in conjunction with a leveraged buyout (LBO) o f the firm.4
The structure and format o f each o f the three essays (chapters 3, 4, and 5) is
identical. That is, each chapter starts with an introduction and literature review specific
to the essay under analysis.

Testable hypotheses, data description and methods of

analysis, results, and conclusions are the four sections to follow within each of the three
chapters. Finally, chapter 6 contains an integrated set o f conclusions from this analysis
o f ESOPs in asymmetric information, insider ownership, and insider trading
frameworks.

4For ESOP LBOs, management borrow s (via the ESOP) to repurchase the firm ’s outstanding equity.
The leveraged ESO P’s 50 percent interest income exclusion, and the LBO’s effectiveness as a takeover
deterrent, made the ESOP LBO strategy popular in the mid-to-late 1980s. A detailed description and
analysis o f ESOP LBOs is provided in Chang (1990).
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review

2.1. Introduction
An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is a tax-qualified, defined contribution
pension plan5 established as a separate legal entity to be managed by a hired trustee.
Similar to most pension plans, ESOPs are subject to the regulations outlined in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act o f 1974 (ERISA). Unlike most plans, which
are required to have their pension fund investments "prudently" managed (i.e.,
diversified), the employee stock ownership trust (ESOT)6 is typically arranged to
purchase a large block of the sponsoring company’s equity.7 Initially the stock is held
in an "unallocated" suspense account, but over time the shares are allocated to the
individual employee accounts8 maintained within the trust. The voting rights attached
to the shares held in the suspense account and individual employee accounts are
controlled by the trustee and employees, respectively.

Furthermore, common and

5The plan is "tax qualified" because a distribution to an employee’s ESOP account is tax deferred
until withdrawn. Furtherm ore, it is a "defined contribution" plan because the firm is required to provide
predetermined contributions to the trust, as opposed to a defined benefit plan where the required benefits
paid to the em ployees on retirement are predetermined.
“This review does not distinguish between "ESOP", the acronym used as a general description o f the
employee benefit plan, and "ESOT", a specific definition o f the legally created trust established to
purchase the firm ’s equity and maintain the em ployees’ pension accounts. Common procedure in the
literature is to refer to both as "E SO P."
7ERISA requires that a minimum o f 50 percent o f the ESOP firm ’s assets must be invested in the
firm ’s equity.
“As an E SO P’s debt is paid o ff (from company contributions and dividends), a comparable dollar
value o f shares is allocated to the individual em ployees’ ESOP accounts. Upon leaving the company,
the employees are given the vested portion o f their "allocated" accounts or allowed to sell the equity back
to the firm at the fair market value.

9
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convertible preferred stocks are the only employer securities qualified for the ESOPrelated tax benefits. Finally, for convertible preferred shares to be qualified, the firm ’s
common stock must have a tradeable market.
In sum, because o f its separate legal status, an ESOP is allowed to incur debt to
purchase the firm ’s convertible preferred and common equity in the open market,
privately, or directly from the company. To aid in the understanding o f the variety of
ESOP structures available to management, several Nexis Newswire press releases are
summarized below:
Standard M otor Products. Inc.. January 9. 1989: "Standard Motor Products said
its board o f directors authorized the establishment o f an employee stock ownership
plan. The company also said it believes that when the plan is funded, the plan will
buy about one million shares o f Standard’s outstanding common stock in the open
m arket."
Proctor & Gamble Company. January 11. 1989: "The Proctor & Gamble Company
today announced the creation of a leveraged ESOP within its existing profit sharing
plans. Concurrently, it announced an expanded common stock repurchase program.
The LESOP trust intends to borrow up to $1.0 billion for a period o f 15 years, with
the loan being guaranteed by the company. The proceeds from the loan will be
used to purchase a new issue of convertible preferred stock from the company.
In a related matter, the board of directors has authorized the company to use the
eventual proceeds from the issuance o f the convertible preferred stock to repurchase
up to 12 million shares of its common stock to more than offset the dilution effect
of the newly issued convertible preferred stock."
Longs Drug Stores. March 8. 1989: "Robert M. Long, president and CEO,
announced that Longs had sold 696,864 shares o f its common stock to the ESOP.
Long stated that the ESOP now owns 14.30 percent o f the Longs outstanding
shares."
Diamond Shamrock R & M. Inc.. April 21. 1989: "The Diamond Shamrock board
o f directors today announced that it has expanded its employee stock program with
the establishment o f a new employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) which purchased
approximately 1.4 million shares o f common stock from the company for $30
million. The company also announced that it will expand its share repurchase
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program to reduce the number o f outstanding shares to a level in line with the pre
expanded ESOP amount o f 24 million common shares."
As a prelude to the asymmetric information analysis in chapter 3, the structure of
the four ESOPs described above are categorized as follows:

Proctor & Gamble: Repurchase, leveraged ESOP, convertible preferred.
Longs Drug Stores: Previously unissued common stock.
Diamond Shamrock:

Previously unissued common stock, repurchase.

Several theories on the establishment o f ESOPs have been forwarded over the
years.

The remainder o f this chapter will review three o f the more common

hypothesized motives for a firm to institute an employee stock ownership plan: 1)
ESOP-related tax benefits; 2) employee motivation; and 3) corporate control.

2.2. ESOP-related Tax Benefits
After the ERISA "acknowledgement"9 of ESOPs in 1974, the importance of an
employee stock ownership plan was further enhanced with the creation o f an ESOPrelated one percent investment tax credit by the Tax Reduction Act o f 1975, and an
additional increase o f one-half percent in 1976 for matched employee contributions.
Despite the subsequent structural changes and ultimate elimination o f the credits in
December o f 1986, significant legislative benefits were added in 1984 and 1986. The
Deficit Reduction Act o f 1984, which took full effect at the beginning o f 1985, allows
corporations to deduct the dividends that are passed through to the owners (employees)

'The Employm ent Retirement Income Security Act o f 1974 included specific ESOP provisions,
boosting their acceptability. Few ESOPs existed prior to the 1974 Act.
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of the allocated ESOP shares. These "passed through" dividends, however, become
taxable income to the employees when received. The ESOP-dividend tax benefit was
expanded by the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 to allow for the deduction o f dividends
received by the unallocated ESOP shares and used to reduce the outstanding debt.
The 1984 tax reform also provided a significant incentive (to establish an ESOP)
in the form o f a 50 percent income exclusion on the interest earned by a lending
institution from an ESOP-related loan.10 Part of this benefit typically flowed through
to the ESOP in the form of a lower debt rate than that of an equivalent risk, non-ESOP
loan. Four years later, Congress, in an attempt to meet its goal o f reducing the deficit,
enacted guidelines to restrict the 50 percent interest exclusion to a minority o f firms
with significant ESOP ownership.

The interest exclusion amendments (restrictions)

generally apply to ESOP-related loans made subsequent to July 10, 1989.
An incorporation o f these tax provisions formed the basis o f Chen and Kessinger
(1985), with its description o f establishing a leveraged ESOP to effectively issue a "tax
deductible equity." That is, they argue that for ESOPs purchasing common stock with
bank loan funds, the firm will enjoy the benefits o f debt and equity. The tax deductible
company contributions to the ESO P,11 used to repay the loan, translate into a reduction
o f taxable income that equals or exceeds the sum o f the interest and principal payments,
a tax benefit superior to that o f ordinary debt. Furthermore, the potential inclusion of

10Per Beatty (1995), "This exclusion was provided to banks for any loan made after July 18, 1984,
and to insurance and investment companies for loans made after O ctober 22, 1986."
“ The tax deductibility o f ESOP contributions used to repay the loan principal is limited to 25% of
the em ployees’ total compensation. No limit exists for company contributions applied to the payment o f
the ESOP loan’s interest.
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dividends as a taxable expense further converts the common stock into a debt-like
instrument, but without the threat o f bankruptcy proceedings if the dividends are
reduced or eliminated.
Despite the enticing tax benefits, most ESOP studies have yet to support a
significant ESOP tax effect. For example, Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) note that
since company contributions are deductible as a business expense under all employee
benefit plans, the deduction of interest and principal payments on a leveraged ESOP are
not a unique tax benefit. If the intent of management is to establish an ESOP solely for
the benefit o f the employees, their assertion is true. If management is also interested
in the funds received from an equity issuance, however, the tax deductible payments
must be considered an added benefit to the ESOP issuance process.
Regardless, Chaplinsky and Niehaus’ assumption leads to their conclusion that the
ESOP-dividend policy and present value of the 50 percent "interest subsidy" (for
leveraged ESOPs) are the only two determinants of the ESOP-related tax benefit.
Moreover, based on their examination of 76 surveys returned by leveraged-ESOP firms,
20 plans (26.3 percent) do not repay their ESOP loan with dividends paid on
unallocated ESOP shares and 57 plans (75 percent) allow the dividends paid on
allocated shares to accrue within the employees’ accounts.

In other words, a large

percentage o f firms are forgoing the available tax benefits. Though the latter policy is
probably employed to defer the personal taxes required on dividends paid directly to the
employees (as a benefit to the employees), the results are used by the authors to support
their argument that "ESOP plans do not appear to be operated to achieve the maximum
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corporate tax benefits." One cannot infer, however, that the tax benefits are irrelevant
merely because the maximum level o f tax benefit is not pursued by the firm. In other
words, maximum tax benefits do not necessarily correlate to optimal firm values. This
is particularly true for firms establishing a leveraged ESOP to obtain funds at a cheaper
cost o f capital because of the 50 percent interest subsidy.
Consistent with Chaplinsky and Niehaus is Scholes and Wolfson (1990), who assert
that the costs associated with maintaining the trust may offset the potential tax benefits
o f the ESOP. Combining the "cost" argument with the fact that some o f the benefits
are not unique to an employee stock ownership pension plan, the authors conclude that
the tax provisions are not the primary reason for creating an ESOP.

The authors

further suggest that the anti-takeover aspects o f the ESOP (as discussed in section 2.4)
are the motivating force behind their establishment, not the "incentives" (section 2.3)
they provide to the employees nor the tax benefits obtained by the firm.
The findings o f Dhillon and Ramirez (1994) support the arguments of Scholes and
Wolfson and Chaplinsky and Niehaus with their multiple regression results that
demonstrate an insignificant relationship between the ESOP announcement’s prediction
error and the firm ’s marginal tax rate in the year prior to the ESOP. Though Dhillon
and Ramirez argue that firms with a high tax rate should experience a larger tax
benefit, and therefore a larger positive prediction error, their "tax benefit" proxy does
not specifically account for the 50 percent interest subsidy attached to leveraged ESOPs
established between 1984 and 1989. In other words, the authors implicitly assume that
all ESOPs have homogeneous tax benefits. This is implied via the structure of their
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regression which suggests that the prior year’s marginal tax rate, not the ESOP
structure (i.e., the presence or absence o f the 50 percent subsidy), is the determinant
o f the market’s "tax effect" reaction.
In contrast to the above, Beatty (1995) specifically accounts for each firm’s ESOPrelated tax benefit. For the 122 ESOP announcements analyzed, Beatty calculates a net
tax benefit by accounting for the interest savings from a 50 percent interest income
exclusion (for leveraged ESOPs) and the value of the dividend tax deduction. Other
factors such as a firm’s net operating loss carryforward and its marginal tax rates also
affect the net tax benefit calculation.

By regressing the firm s’ two-day cumulative

prediction errors onto a set o f explanatory variables, including the net tax benefit, the
results suggest that the market’s reaction to the ESOP announcement is positively
affected by the size of the net tax benefit.
In addition, Chang and Mayers (1992) claim that their results are consistent with
the presence o f an ESOP-related tax benefit. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the
change in shareholder wealth is positively affected by the size of the ESOP.

They

suggest that this is consistent with the contention that an ESOP’s tax benefit enhances
firm value. They also contend, however, that the results support the argument that
ESOPs increase the employees’ motivation, and therefore enhance firm value.

2.3. Employee Motivation
A common explanation for the establishment o f an ESOP is the alignment of
interests o f the employee-owner with those o f the outside shareholders. That is, many
claim that ownership enhances a worker’s commitment to his/her job, thus increasing
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the overall work performance and firm value. Furthermore, the presence o f an ESOP
is believed to reduce employee turnover12 and an associated cost of hiring/training new
employees.

An increase in employee ownership may also improve the level of

cooperation between the employees and management, an additional effect believed to
improve the overall performance of the firm.
On the other hand, despite the potentially large block o f ownership purchased by
the ESOP, the individual allocation o f shares to the employees may be minimal.
Furthermore, an increase in an individual’s effort may not have a noticeable impact on
the share price movement.

Given these scenarios, the potential for a "free-rider"

problem may offset any motivational increases in productivity.
Support for an ESOP’s enhancement o f employee motivation is provided by a study
performed by the National Center for Employee Ownership that documented the
attitudes of 2,700 employees from 37 ESOP firms. The findings demonstrate a strong
direct relationship between the level of employee ownership and commitment,
satisfaction, and employee effort.
Though not necessarily a direct measure of an ESOP’s effect on employee
motivation (and, correspondingly, the motivation’s effect on firm value), the
examination o f a firm’s operational performance subsequent to an ESOP has been
analyzed by many.

For example, Livingston and Henry (1980) compare several

profitability ratios of ESOP firms to those of a control group of non-ESOP firms.

i2A s noted in Chang and M ayers (1992), legislation requires that the vesting o f ESOP shares must
occur within seven years o f participation if an incremental yearly vesting (percentage) is applied. If there
are no yearly percentage increases, the full vesting must occur within five years. T he incentive to
become fully vested is hypothesized to reduce employee turnover.
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Their results infer that the ESOP firms had significantly lower profits despite an
insignificant difference in several risk-related figures (e.g., liquidity, leverage, and
variability). The authors conclude that "the costs o f the plan outweigh the financial
benefit to the firm."

Similar inferences were produced in the 1987 report by the

General Accounting Office (GAO) which documented the results o f several studies that
analyzed the performance effects o f ESOPs established prior to 1981. The GAO report
notes that the majority o f studies were unable to support a belief that ESOPs have a
significant effect on firm performance, as measured by various profitability,
productivity, and growth statistics.
In contrast to the GAO findings, Rosen (1990) finds that ESOPs have a positive
influence on the income growth o f the firm.

To be specific, Rosen compared the

growth patterns (of 45 ESOP firms) o f the five-year periods before and after the
creation o f the ESOP. After adjusting each time-frame for the performance levels of
the firms’ competitors, the results lead the author to conclude that "the ESOP firms
grew 3-4 percent faster (depending on the measure used) than they would have without
an ESOP."

It was further noted that the majority of this increase came from the

companies that had a higher degree o f employee input and participation in the decision
making process.
Finally, a more recent "ESOP-productivity" study was performed by Mikkelson and
Partch (1993). Though the authors’ analysis is an attempt to determine the relation
between the change in managerial voting power (and their personal equity ownership)
and the firm’s operating performance, they find that the sampled firms experience a
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subsequent belovv-normal operating income.

Other recent studies (e.g., Chang and

Mayers, 1992, and Beatty, 1995), through their regression o f prediction errors onto
proxies for employee incentive, have found mixed results in support o f the contention
that ESOPs enhance firm value with the increased motivation o f employees. In sum,
the diverse results found in the "motivational" studies are probably attributed to the
extreme difficulty o f determining an accurate measure o f ESOP-related employee
incentives.

2.4. ESOPS and Corporate Control
Recent ESOP literature has predominantly concentrated on the corporate control
aspects affected by the creation o f an ESOP. As argued by Gordon and Pound (1990)
in their analysis of ESOPs established in the presence and absence o f takeover activity,
because the employees typically dislike the option of their firm being taken over (in fear
o f a subsequent layoff), all ESOP shares allocated to their account will be voted in
opposition of a takeover (in favor o f management). Furthermore, because many ESOP
trusts are required to vote the unallocated shares in the same proportion as the allocated
shares, it is assumed that the unallocated ESOP shares will also vote against a proposed
takeover attempt that is opposed by management. For those trustees not required to
vote "proportionally", it is assumed that they too will vote with management, a material
source of their income.

In sum, it is assumed that ESOPs effectively increase the

percentage o f votes controlled by management.
Supporters o f the management entrenchment hypothesis would state that the
assumed increase in the managers’ voting power has a negative impact on firm value

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19

because the outsider’s ownership influence and the probability o f takeover are reduced.
The negative impact is supposedly caused by the allowance o f an increase in managerial
perquisite consumption without retribution.

In other words, an enlarged conflict of

interest between management and the shareholders is one effect o f an increase in the
voting power o f management.13

In contrast, the shareholder interests hypothesis

predicts an increase in firm value when the managerial voting power is enhanced. This
effect is predicted because the additional votes from the ESOP will be used by
management to ensure a maximum takeover premium if a buyout ensues.
This "vote with management" assumption is particularly important to the significant
percentage of ESOP firms incorporated in Delaware, a state which initiated a
supermajority ("freeze-out") provision in December, 1987. The law effectively states
that unless 85 percent of a firm ’s nonaligned (i.e., non-insider) shares approve a
potential takeover, the bidding firm is prohibited from engaging in any business
combination with the target firm for a three-year period. Furthermore, ESOP shares
are defined by Delaware law as "nonaligned", despite their often assumed voting
allegiance to management.
A final important "control" event is the January 9, 1989 Delaware Court decision
which upheld the increase in ownership (to 14 percent) by Polaroid’s ESOP despite the
presence of takeover rumors (the ESOP was announced prior to the formal bid). Given

l3This should not be confused with the arguments o f Jensen and M eckling (1976), w ho contend that
an increase in a m anager’s personal (cash-flow) ownership aligns the interests o f management and the
shareholders. ESOPs increase managerial voting power, not cash-flow ownership.
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that 85 percent o f the firm ’s nonaligned shares must vote in favor o f a takeover,
Polaroid was able to effectively block a takeover attempt by Shamrock Holdings.
The ESOP literature reports fairly consistent results for the market’s reaction to an
ESOP announced while a firm is subject to a takeover.

For example, Gordon and

Pound (1990) and Chang and Mayers (1992) find a significant negative market reaction
to the announcement o f an ESOP in the presence o f a takeover threat. Furthermore,
Beatty’s (1995) cross-sectional analysis documents a decrease in shareholder wealth for
ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
In addition to the testing noted above, Gordon and Pound split their "takeover"
group into pre- and post-Polaroid samples, and find a significant negative effect for
both groupings. This latter finding, however, is in conflict with Dhillon and Ramirez
(1994), who document a significant positive (significant negative) effect associated with
the pre- (post-) Polaroid time-period. This also differs with Chaplinsky and Niehaus
(1994), who find an insignificant positive prediction error in the post-Polaroid timeperiod. Dhillon and Ramirez suggest that the conflicting results are caused by samplesize differences. Nevertheless, the Polaroid decision is still considered a relevant event
because it establishes the court’s allowance o f an ESOP as a legitimate takeover
defense.
Additional corporate control evidence is provided by Gordon and Pound, who
document a negative wealth effect for announcements of ESOPs in which the level of
ESOP votes and insider ownership shares is subsequently sufficient to veto a takeover
proposal. "Sufficiency" was subjectively determined to be the level of ownership that
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exceeds 95 percent of the votes necessary to prevent a takeover.

The connection

between the veto power and the negative prediction error is weakened, however, by the
small sample size o f ten.

Similar to Gordon and Pound, Beatty (1995) uses a "95

percent" veto cut-off when she regresses the ESOP firm ’s prediction errors onto several
variables, including an indicator variable used to account for firms that obtain veto
power with the establishment of the ESOP. In contrast to Gordon and Pound’s results,
an insignificant effect was associated with the "control change" variable.
Two closely related examinations of ESOPs and their effect on corporate control
were presented by Chang and Mayers (1992) and Mikkelson and Partch (1993). Chang
and Mayers contend that firms with a high level of managerial (insider) ownership may
establish an ESOP, in conjunction with a percentage sell-off o f the manager’s cash-flow
equity, in order to maintain a level of entrenchment yet reduce the firm-specific risk
assumed by management.

Support for their argument is a significant correlation

between the reduction in the percentage o f insider ownership surrounding the
announcement and the percentage increase in the number o f ESOP shares. A detailed
discussion of their inferences and the associated shortcomings is provided in chapter 5.
Chang and Mayers further assert that because of this ESOP establishment/insider
sell-off relationship, the market interprets the ESOP announcement as a negative signal
for firms with a high level of insider ownership.

The negative effect is predicted

because the market infers that there will be a reduction in the insider ownership of
cash-flow claims without a corresponding loss o f voting power. This combination leads
to a reduction in the alignment of interests (between management and the shareholders)
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and an increase in the managers’ incentive to expand their consumption o f perquisites.
In effect, an increase in agency costs without a corresponding decrease in entrenchment
costs produce an overall negative effect.

Despite the logic, Chang and M ayers’

empirical support for such a contention is relatively weak, as discussed in chapter 5.

2.5. Summary
Three reasons frequently given for the creation o f an ESOP are to take advantage
o f special tax benefits, to motivate employees, and to secure management’s control of
the firm. Empirical studies report mixed support for the first two, suggesting that these
benefits, if real, are offset by other costs associated with the ESOP. Empirical research
into management’s self-interests and the establishment o f an ESOP is more consistent,
particularly with respect to ESOPs that seemingly entrench management. In this light,
the three essays o f this dissertation pursue different aspects of the relations between
management’s own interests and the establishment o f an ESOP.
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Chapter 3
Essay One: Asymmetric Information

3.1. Introduction
Though asymmetric information is a common theory used to explain the market’s
reaction to a security issuance announcement, this explanation has only been lightly
applied to the shareholder wealth effects associated with the announcement o f an ESOP
and the underlying security issue. Such is the purpose o f this chapter. To be specific,
this essay asserts that for most ESOP announcements, the type of security and source
o f funds used by the employee stock ownership trust to purchase the security, and the
corresponding

asymmetric information implications, are

the dominant factors

influencing the market’s reaction to an ESOP announcement. Furthermore, for ESOP
formations involving a cash inflow to the corporation, the use of the funds received
from the ESOP will also affect the market’s reaction.

This is particularly true for

ESOP firms that simultaneously announce that the funds will be used to repurchase a
block o f the firm ’s common stock.
In sum, the market is not truly reacting to the ESOP announcement, per se, but to
the underlying structure (i.e., the type/source/use) of its formation.

Furthermore,

because ESOP-related security transactions affect the firm ’s employees in a more direct
manner than comparable non-ESOP transactions, the market’s perception o f firm value
will differ between the two.

This latter contention is the foundation o f a revised

interpretation of the asymmetric information hypothesis and its explanation o f the
market’s reaction to the securities issuance structure of an announced ESOP.

23
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Prior to the specifics, a brief explanation o f the traditional asymmetric information
argument, and a proposed revision to it, will be discussed. A description o f the data,
method o f analysis, and results follow the traditional and revised asymmetric
information sections. Concluding remarks are provided at the end o f this chapter.
3.1.1. The T raditional Asym m etric Inform ation A rgum ent
The asymmetric information hypothesis, and several closely associated signalling
models, can be attributed to the problems (outlined in Akerlof, 1970) caused by a
difference in information possessed by buyers (investors) and sellers (management).
To be specific, the often referred to "lemons problem" occurs when the seller possesses
private information about the product being sold (the firm ’s common stock). Because
the buyer is not privy to this critical information, he or she is unable to differentiate
between the quality of products that outwardly appear to be equal.

Without

differentiation, a pooling process occurs, and the buyer’s offer price becomes an
average o f the visibly similar products. Since sellers will receive an average price for
their product regardless of the quality, profit is maximized by producing a low-quality,
low-cost product.

Therefore, without the buyer’s ability to differentiate the quality

(and, therefore, "true" price) of a product, the motivation to sell a high-quality product
is eliminated.
Signalling models address this problem by suggesting that firms with high-quality
products are able to garner a higher price through a process that signals the true value
o f the product. The signal creates a separating equilibrium and allows the buyers to
differentiate between low- and high-quality products. A similar argument is made that
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managers will signal that their firm ’s stock price is undervalued when the market is
unaware of the positive private information the managers possess.

This latter

contention is the foundation o f this essay.
The process of overcoming the lemons problem via signalling is modelled by many
(e.g., Spence, 1973, Leland and Pyle, 1977, Ross, 1977, Bhattacharya, 1979, Miller
and Rock, 1985, and Myers and Majluf, 1984).

The core o f the asymmetric

information hypothesis is the assumption that managers are sole possessors o f detailed
information about the firm ’s future cash flows and, therefore, the true firm value. The
market, aware of this private information process, attempts to infer a firm ’s true value
from the decisions made (and publicly announced) by management. For example, Ross
(1977) asserts that a firm that announces an increase in leverage implies to the market
that managers possess private information about favorable future cash flows. In other
words, the increase in leverage implies that management believes the firm has ample
cash flows to cover the increase in debt-related obligations. Thus, an implied cash-flow
increase causes the market to revalue the firm upward.
A second example o f how a firm ’s private information is released to the market is
provided by the dividend models o f Bhattacharya (1979) and M iller and Rock (1985).
Similar to the arguments in Ross, optimistic future cash flows are implied when a firm
announces an increase in its dividend payout.

The increased payout signals to the

market that future cash flows are sufficient to meet the firm ’s future dividend (and debt)
obligations. Once again, the positive inference leads to an upward revaluation o f the
firm. It should also be noted that Miller and Rock’s cash-flow model suggests that all
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security issuances are taken as a negative signal that the firm’s cash flows are
insufficient to cover future dividend and debt obligations.
Because this essay examines the "structure" of the ESOP, it focuses on the value
o f a firm inferred by the market by the type of security issue offered by the firm. A
Myers and M ajluf (1984) approach is, therefore, applied to the ESOP analyses. Like
most signalling models, Myers and M ajluf’s model assumes that managers know the
true value o f their firm because they are privy to a more accurate (and larger) set of
information about the firm’s future cash flows.

Though their model addresses the

potentially conflicting signals o f an announced new project and the related financing,
the model can be interpreted as suggesting that there exists a private information
process that guides the security offering decisions o f the firm. It is further assumed
that the market is aware of this process, and uses the manager’s decision to infer the
true value o f the firm. The authors also contend that the inference is guided by the
market’s acknowledgement o f the fact that when a firm needs capital (to fund a
project), the manager’s concern for the existing shareholders will determine the type of
security issued by the firm.
One application of this theory is the belief that firms with negative private
information prefer to obtain funds through the issuance o f common stock. It is further
assumed that the issuance of an overvalued equity is transacted to benefit the firm ’s
existing shareholders.

Aware o f this process, the market infers from the issuance

announcement that the equity is overpriced and therefore adjusts the stock’s price
downward. Empirical support is provided by the market’s significant negative average
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reaction to the announcement o f seasoned common stock issuances (Asquith and
Mullins, 1986, Masulis and Korwar, 1986, and Mikkelson and Partch, 1986).
In contrast, Chang and Mayers (1992) find a significant positive mean excess return
(of 0.94 percent) for the announcement of new common shares purchased by the ESOP.
Their analysis, however, fails to separately examine ESOPs established in the presence
and absence of takeover activity, and also ignores the effects of simultaneous security
transactions and "source of fund" factors.14 A separate analysis o f ESOPs announced
in the presence of takeover activity is necessary because the "asymmetric" signal is
eliminated by the market’s belief that managerial entrenchment is the purpose o f the
ESOP (to be discussed in the second essay).

It is further argued that the effects of

simultaneous security transactions must also be accounted for. For example, despite
the notable differences, the following ESOP announcements would all be categorized
by Chang and Mayers as a previously unissued common stock transaction:
1) The ESOP uses pension plan surplus funds (source) to purchase newly issued
common stock (type) and convertible preferred shares (type) from the firm.
2) The ESOP purchases newly issued common stock (type) from the firm with the funds
from a bank loan (source) (defined as a leveraged ESOP) that is guaranteed by the firm.
The firm also announces that it will repurchase shares on the open market (use) to
offset the dilution.

“ Based on a Leland and Pyle (1977) argument, failure to account for simultaneous transactions is
particularly important when the presence o f repurchased equity is considered. Leland and Pyle contend
that managers privy to positive firm-specific information do not want to dilute their percentage o f cash
flow ownership. A simultaneous repurchase o f equity prevents such a dilution and, therefore, implies
positive inform ation about the true value o f the firm. Conversely, an ESOP structured with common
stock and no simultaneous repurchase lacks this positive implication.
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3) The ESOP purchases common stock {type) from the firm in conjunction with the
establishment o f a loan from the firm {source). Furthermore, the ESOP was established
in the presence o f takeover activity.
To demonstrate the potential magnitude of this problem, a comparable non-ESOP
analysis would categorize both equity-for-debt exchanges and seasoned common stock
offerings as "previously unissued" events. A pooling o f these distinct events is more
than likely unacceptable in financial research.

Regardless, a result that is probably

related to this pooled classification is that even though the ESOP/common stock
findings are statistically significant and positive, only 48 percent o f Chang and M ayers’
previously unissued sample exhibits a positive prediction error. Therefore, as noted in
the introduction of this section, one purpose o f this analysis is to account for these
categorical differences with a "type/source/use" examination.
A Myers and M ajluf interpretation has also been applied to non-ESOP repurchases
o f common stock, bank loans, and convertible preferred issue announcements.

For

example, a repurchase of common stock announcement implies to the market that
management believes the security is sufficiently underpriced, thus inducing the market
to adjust the price o f the equity upward. This prediction is supported by Dann (1981)
and Vermaelen (1981) for open market repurchases and tender offer repurchases
(significant excess returns of approximately 3 percent and 15 percent, respectively).
The larger positive reactions to the tender offer repurchases are hypothesized by
Vermaelen to be caused by the sizable premium offered and the typically larger number
o f shares repurchased in a tender offer.
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In the analysis o f ESOP-related repurchases, Chang and Mayers find a significant
positive effect for open market repurchases and tender offer repurchases (1.17 percent
and 3.5 percent mean excess returns, respectively).

In addition, they find an

insignificant -0.30 percent reaction to the announcement o f firms repurchasing equity
from a target shareholder (non-takeover related).

Similar to the problems in the

ESOP/common stock analysis noted above, the effects of additional securities and
sources o f funds that may be associated with an ESOP "repurchase" announcement are
not separated by the authors. Moreover, they do not separately examine the market’s
reaction to ESOP repurchases announced in the presence and absence o f takeover
activity.

One potentially related effect is Chang and M ayers’ finding that only 56

percent o f the sample of open market repurchases had a positive prediction error, a
statistically insignificant result.
With its establishment, an ESOP commonly incurs private debt (typically a bank
loan) as the source o f funds used to purchase the common or convertible equity.
Leveraged ESOPs were particularly popular after the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act,
which allowed for the deduction o f 50 percent of the interest income received by the
lender. The favorable tax treatment often resulted in a loan at a rate below prime.
For non-ESOP bank loan announcements, the asymmetric information hypothesis
asserts that managers possess positive information that can not be directly disclosed to
the public market. One version o f this hypothesis asserts that direct disclosure would
not be credible. Alternatively, Campbell (1979) assumes that managers possess positive
private information that would be highly beneficial to the firm’s competitors. A public
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revelation o f the information would therefore be harmful to shareholder wealth.

As

suggested by Campbell, Diamond (1984), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), a
private information processor (e.g., a bank) is necessary to determine the correct cost
o f capital without a public release o f the valuable private information.

The market

infers from the private debt announcement that the equity is underpriced and reacts
accordingly.

The significant positive market responses to bank loan announcements

found in James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), and Slovin, Johnson, and
Glascock (1992) support these contentions.
With respect to ESOPs and private debt, Chang and Mayers report that their 151
leveraged and 125 non-leveraged ESOPs produce significant positive average excess
returns o f 0.80 percent and 0.65 percent, respectively. Given that the results are not
significantly different from each other despite the tax benefit differences, and the fact
that only 54 percent and 50 percent o f the samples had a positive prediction error, the
exclusion o f the additional simultaneous transactions (i.e., absence/presence of
takeover, "type", and "use") in Chang and M ayers’ analysis is noteworthy.
Finally, for non-ESOP convertible preferred issues, the asymmetric information
hypothesis argues that the market infers that the degree o f negative private information
is insufficient to cause management to issue common stock. On the other hand, the
market also infers that the managers do not possess a level o f positive private
information necessary to induce a bank loan agreement. Therefore, a market reaction
between that o f a bank loan and common stock announcement is predicted (Smith,
1986). One could further argue that the effect is more likely to be negative because the
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non-zero probability of a subsequent common stock conversion implies an overpriced
equity. Linn and Pinegar’s (1988) significant finding of a -1.4 percent average excess
return to the announcement o f a non-ESOP convertible preferred stock issue is
consistent with these asymmetric information predictions.
For ESOP-related convertible preferred announcements, Chang and M ayers’
findings o f an insignificant -0.32 percent average prediction error do not refute the
asymmetric information hypothesis. Once again, the presence/absence o f a takeover
and "source/type/use" classifications are not separated and therefore may underlie the
insignificant result.
It should finally be noted that Beatty (1995) briefly mentions that her results support
an ESOP/asymmetric information connection.

Beatty regresses the cumulative

prediction errors o f 122 ESOP firms onto numerous variables, including two
independent variables that account for the size (calculated as a percentage o f shares
outstanding) o f the newly issued common stock and convertible preferred equity, if
any.15

Beatty asserts that the significant negative coefficients attached to these

variables support the asymmetric information hypothesis. The results, however, appear
to be in conflict with a similar regression performed by Chang and Mayers, who
document an insignificant coefficient attached to their convertible preferred explanatory
variable.

Though an independent variable for common stock is excluded from their

sample, Chang and M ayers’ event study analysis produces significant positive
(insignificant) results for the sample of ESOPs structured with common stock

15It should also be noted that Beatty does not control for the role o f repurchased equity.
structured w ith repurchased equity account for 56 percent o f her sample, however.

ESOPs

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32

(convertible preferred equity).

In terms of Beatty’s argument, these results do not

support the traditional asymmetric information hypothesis on securities issuances.
In brief, the predictions o f the traditional version of the asymmetric information
hypothesis are not well met in studies of ESOPs. In contrast to the predicted negative
reaction, the market’s response to ESOP-related issuances o f common stock is positive.
ESOP repurchases generate a smaller positive response than non-ESOP repurchases.
And the use o f private debt to leverage an ESOP is associated with a positive response
as predicted. The relevance o f this latter consistency is weakened, however, by the
comparable positive reaction to ESOPs structured without private debt. Finally, the
choice o f convertible preferred stock for the ESOP generates a non-significant market
response, not the negative reaction predicted and observed elsewhere.

Thus, the

magnitude and direction o f the market’s response to an ESOP transaction often times
differ from those predicted by the asymmetric information hypothesis.

A further

stratification of the ESOP structure is examined to explain these differences.

3.1.2. The Revised Asymmetric Information Hypothesis
The revised interpretation is based on two theories. The first theory, as outlined
in section 2.3, states that ESOPs are established to align the interests of the employees
with those o f the shareholders (i.e., established to motivate the employees).

The

second theory asserts that a firm’s securities issuance decision is used by the market to
infer the true value of the firm (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
The Myers and M ajluf adverse selection model is founded on the assumptions that
managers have superior information and that their decisions are made in a manner that
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benefits the firm ’s existing shareholders.

In comparison to this ("traditional")

asymmetric information hypothesis, the revised hypothesis contends that the manager’s
decisions are not only made on behalf o f the existing shareholders, but the employees
and managers as well. For typical (i.e., non-ESOP) security issuance announcements,
the predicted traditional asymmetric information results are unchanged by this expanded
assumption. That is, the manager’s concern for the welfare o f the employees does not
affect the predicted market reaction because equity is not specifically distributed to the
employees. Conversely, for security issuance announcements that involve a substantial
distribution (or contingent distribution [e.g., executive options]) of shares to the
managers, employees, or a representative trust, the predicted results are altered by the
revised hypothesis.
In comparison to the Myers and M ajluf predictions, the revised hypothesis asserts
that managers will not issue an overpriced security when the purchasers are the
employees o f the firm.

The foundation o f this assertion is the fact that the equity

distribution to the employees is typically meant to "motivate the work-force." Given
the many available forms o f an employee benefit, compensating the workers with an
overvalued equity runs counter to the overall objective of the equity distribution. That
is, given the additional assumption that the welfare o f the employees affects a subset
o f managerial decisions, it is logical to infer that the establishment o f a firm ’s equitybased compensation plan does not involve an overvalued security.
Applying the revised hypothesis to an equity-based compensation plan is consistent
with the Leland and Pyle (1977) argument, in that a positive signal should be inferred
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by the market because the employees are incurring additional firm-specific risk
(typically) without additional compensation.

Assuming the employees/managers are

rational, the market concludes that the managers possess a sufficient degree o f positive
private information to offset the added risk the ESOP imposes on their employees. If
the additional risk were not offset, the motivational effect would be diminished and the
firm ’s performance would therefore be adversely affected. Thus, the revised hypothesis
is consistent with an extension o f Leland and Pyle because it states that the changes in
the employees’ firm-specific risk, in addition to the managers’ firm-specific risk (as
they argue), are recognized by the market.
Research supportive of the revised asymmetric information argument is provided
by Bhagat, Brickley, and Lease (1985), who find a significant positive excess return
associated with the announcement o f a stock purchase plan and an insignificant market
reaction to the announcement o f an IRS 423 plan. These are plans in which the firm ’s
managers and employees are given the option to purchase the stock of their employer,
often at a discount (for IRS 423 plans) or with the aid of a company loan (for stock
purchase plans). The authors conclude from the insignificant reaction (to the IRS 423
announcement) that the plan is simply meant to raise capital for the firm. If true, one
would expect that the affect on shareholder wealth should be comparable to that o f a
seasoned equity offering. Based on the differences in the market’s reaction, the results
are consistent with the revised asymmetric information assumption that the market
believes that management does not want to compensate their employees with an
overpriced security.
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To summarize, the revised hypothesis states that the market’s reaction to an ESOP
announcement is partially guided by the private information implied by the type of
security purchased by the ESOP. In addition, the market assumes that the manager’s
security issuance decision is made with the employees’ (and manager’s) welfare in
mind. Therefore, unlike a Myers and M ajluf prediction of a negative market reaction,
a common stock ESOP announcement is predicted to produce a non-negative
shareholder wealth effect. This is due to the belief that in order to maintain or improve
the level o f employee motivation, management does not want to compensate the work
force with an overpriced security.
Also in contrast with Myers and M ajluf is the contention that a convertible
preferred ESOP announcement implies a level of negative asymmetric information
because the managers are unwilling to fund the ESOP with the firm ’s (overpriced)
common stock. Therefore, the revised hypothesis predicts that an ESOP structured with
convertible preferred stock should produce a larger negative market reaction than a
common stock ESOP, a prediction exactly opposite to that of the traditional asymmetric
information argument. Finally, the revised hypothesis predicts a positive reaction to
"repurchased" and "leveraged" ESOPs, based on arguments comparable to the
traditional asymmetric information contentions.

3.2. ESOP/Asymmetric Information Hypotheses
Because prior research does not stratify ESOPs by the presence/absence o f a
takeover and the "source/type/use" structure o f the ESOP, its findings can not be used
to support a revised asymmetric information explanation of the market’s reaction. In
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other words, some prior results may be diluted by the failure to segregate the
presence/absence o f takeover activity, while other findings are statistically significant
solely because o f the presence o f additional structural elements (e.g., repurchases,
leverage, etc.).

For example, the pooling o f takeover and non-takeover ESOPs

structured with repurchased equity may have a smaller documented reaction than the
effects noted from separate analyses o f "repurchased" ESOPs announced in the presence
and absence o f takeover activity.

In other words, the announcement o f an ESOP

structured with repurchased equity will have a significant positive (negative) market
reaction in the absence (presence) o f takeover activity, two results that counteract each
other when analyzed on an aggregate basis.
A second example is Chang and M ayers’ results suggesting that ESOPs structured
with previously unissued common stock have a significant positive effect on shareholder
wealth. Though they argue that the results are consistent with a private equity issue
(despite the absence o f an external monitor), the revised hypothesis asserts that the
positive results are driven by a sample in which a high percentage of the
ESOP/common stock structures include a repurchase o f equity announcement. Given
the above, the purpose o f the following analysis is to provide support for the revised
asymmetric information explanation o f the market’s reaction to an ESOP announcement
by examining the various "presence/absence of takeover" and "type/source/use"
combinations. The specific hypotheses (expressed as expected results) are as follows:
1) Firms that announce an ESOP structured with repurchased equity (in the absence
of takeover activity) will experience positive gains in shareholder wealth.
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2) ESOPs structured with private debt (i.e., leveraged ESOPs) will also infer positive
private information to the market, thus causing the firms’ values to be revalued
upwards.
The first two contentions are consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis,
which states that the market infers that management believes that their firm ’s equity is
undervalued. The undervalued inference results in an increase in shareholder wealth
on the day o f the announcement.
3)

A non-negative market reaction is predicted for firms that announce an ESOP

structured with common stock (in the absence of takeover).
4)

The effect on firm value from an announcement that the ESOP will purchase

convertible preferred equity will be more negative than that o f an ESOP/common stock
effect.
Hypotheses 3) and 4), the result o f a revised asymmetric information argument, are
exactly opposite to the predictions made by the traditional asymmetric information
hypothesis. The reversal is predicted because o f the belief that ESOPs are meant to
motivate the employees.

Since funding the ESOP trust with an overpriced common

stock is counter to this objective, the market will not infer negative private information
when the common stock ESOP is announced. A more negative reaction is expected for
ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity because it implies to the market that
management did not want to sell the ESOP an overpriced common stock.
The fifth hypothesis predicts that the information inferred by the securities issuance
structure is overshadowed by the presence of takeover activity and anti-takeover
(entrenchment) implications of the ESOP. To be specific:
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5) ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity, regardless o f structure, infer
to the market that management intends to fight the takeover. This, in combination with
the effectiveness of an ESOP as a deterrent,16 causes a downward revaluation o f the
firm.

3.2.1. Firm Size, ESOP Size, and Asymmetric Information Hypotheses
This section will outline the hypothesized effects that firm size and ESOP size have
on the level o f asymmetric information implied by the announcement. In regards to
firm size, many believe that large firms have an increased number of external monitors
analyzing the value o f the firm. It is also assumed that an enlarged number o f monitors
translates into a smaller degree of asymmetric information and, therefore, a smaller
price reaction when an action of management (e.g., ESOP establishment) is announced.
Atiase (1985) similarly argues for a connection between firm size and the degree of
private information possessed by the firm.

Atiase asserts that due to the inherent

structure o f gathering and processing information about a firm, an effect exists (similar
to an economy of scale effect) where the gathering/processing o f "large firm"
information has a lower average cost than that of a small firm. In other words, it is
more expensive (less profitable) to monitor/analyze the activities o f a smaller firm.
This correlates to a lower number of external monitors, a higher degree o f asymmetric

16Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1994) document that 20 o f the 42 (48 percent) "takeover" ESOPs they
reviewed experienced a change in management. In comparison, 102 o f 120 (85 percent) non-ESOP
targets were successfully taken over. The difference in percentages is statistically significant at the one
percent level. See chapter 4, essay 2, for additional ESOP anti-takeover (entrenchment) and corporate
control implications.
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information, and therefore a larger market reaction when a small firm announcement
is made.
In support of these contentions, Pugh and Jahera (1990), in their attempt to explain
the magnitude o f the market’s reaction to tender offer announcements, find that the
excess returns are inversely related to firm size. This evidence supports the belief that
a smaller degree of information is conveyed by actions taken by larger firms.
Similarly, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) calculate the excess returns o f large and
small firms for the two years following a tender offer announcement. Support for the
assertion that small-firm announcements provide a stronger signal o f firm value is
provided by their findings of statistically significant (insignificant) positive returns for
the small (large) firms.
Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) also support the firm size/market reaction
arguments.

By separating their sample into small and large firms, the authors

demonstrate that the share value o f small firms is significantly enhanced when new and
renewal bank loans are announced. Conversely, the large-firm effects are insignificant
for the new and renewal announcements.
In contrast to the empirical research noted above, the "firm size'VESOP analyses
will be structured differently. To be specific, it is argued that the magnitude o f the
market’s reaction and the size of the ESOP firm are negatively related. Magnitude is
stressed because prior ESOP studies have shown that certain ESOP stratifications
produce significant positive cumulative prediction errors (e.g., ESOPs structured with
repurchased equity), while others create significant and negative market reactions (e.g.,
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ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity). To correct for a potential
pooling effect, the magnitude (i.e., absolute value) of the market’s reaction, not the
cumulative prediction errors (CPEs), is regressed onto a firm-size variable. Consistent
with the asymmetric information argument, an inverse relationship is predicted.
If the absolute value contention is neglected, the predicted positive and negative
market reactions will offset each other when the relation between the size o f the firm
and its cumulative prediction errors is examined. Chang and Mayers (1992) fall into
this trap when they regress the ESOP firms’ CPEs onto four slightly altered sets of
twenty-plus explanatory variables, each including the log o f equity capitalization as a
proxy for firm size. Though the significant negative association between the proxy and
the prediction error is supportive of the firm-size effect for positive prediction errors
(i.e., small firms have larger positive prediction errors), the regression analysis falls
short when intuitively applied to negative prediction errors.

To be specific, the

asymmetric information application of the firm-size effect further predicts that the
magnitude o f the negative prediction errors is larger for small firms, an expectation in
conflict with Chang and M ayers’ regression results. Their findings suggest that large
negative CPEs are associated with large firms, not small firms (that possess a
hypothesized high level of asymmetric information).

Therefore, to correct for this

problem, the absolute value of the CPE should be used in such regressions.
It is further suggested that the degree of the asymmetric information implied by a
firm ’s announcement is affected by the size of the security issue (calculated as a
percentage o f total market value). For example, Ross (1977) suggests that a sizeable

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41

increase in leverage implies a substantial increase in future cash flows because
considerable cash flows are necessary to pay for the increase in debt obligations. In
contrast, a Miller and Rock (1985) interpretation suggests that a larger security issuance
implies that management believes the firm has insufficient future earnings to cover
future dividend distributions and debt obligations. Though the direction o f Ross’ and
M iller and Rock’s predicted effects on shareholder value is in conflict, both predictions
argue for a positive relation between the size o f the issue and the magnitude o f the
market’s announcement-day reaction.
Empirical support for the positive relation between the security issuance size and
the effect on firm value is extensive.

For example, Masulis (1980) and Vermaelen

(1981) find a direct relationship between the size of a tender offer repurchase and the
magnitude of the positive excess return.

In addition, Dann (1981) and Vermaelen

(1981) contend that because tender offer repurchases typically involve a higher
percentage o f the firm ’s outstanding equity than that o f an open market repurchase, a
significantly larger excess return is documented for the tender offers. In connection
with the asymmetric information hypothesis, the results suggest that a greater
commitment o f repurchased equity provides a stronger positive inference o f future price
performance. A final example is provided by the results noted in Mikkelson and Partch
(1986). Their examination of seasoned equity offerings finds that the announcementday decrease in shareholder wealth has a direct relationship with the size o f the issue.
That is, they note that the larger the size o f the offering, the greater the negative
cumulative excess return.
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In sum, it is predicted that the magnitude of private information inferred by the
ESOP-related security issue and the size of the ESOP are positively related.

Once

again, because o f the various factors that produce positive and negative prediction
errors, the magnitude (i.e., absolute value) o f the price reaction must be used, not the
cumulative prediction error. Finally, (as will be noted in section 3.3.3) the ESOP size
and firm size factors are analyzed in unison to determine their relationship with the
magnitude of the stock price reaction.

The final two ESOP/asymmetric information

hypotheses are specified as follows:
6) A significant negative relationship between firm size and the absolute value o f the
cumulative excess return is predicted.
7) A significant positive relationship between ESOP size and the absolute value o f the
cumulative excess return is predicted.

3.3. Data and Method of Analysis
3.3.1. Data Description
The sample consists of 204 NYSE/AMEX and 115 Nasdaq17 ESOPs announced
between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1993. An initial sample o f 458 firms was
gathered from a Nexis Newswire search o f ESOP-related press releases.

To reduce

contamination, firms with a simultaneous non-ESOP announcement (e.g., dividend
change, quarterly earnings, and shareholder rights announcements) were excluded from
the sample. To further detect contamination, a firm-specific search o f the Wall Street

17NYSE = New York Stock Exchange; AMEX = American Stock Exchange; and Nasdaq =
National Association o f Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system.
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Journal Index (WSJI) was performed to locate significant events around the ESOP
announcement. Firms with material announcements in the three-day period surrounding
the ESOP event were deleted from the initial sample. Finally, firms with an inadequate
number o f CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) daily returns were deleted
from the initial sample.
To determine whether takeover activity is present, the WSJI was reviewed for
takeover-related articles printed within the one-year period prior to the ESOP
announcement.18 In addition, a Nexis Newswire press release search by firm name and
keywords "takeover" and "buyout" was performed to detect takeover activity in the year
preceding the announcement. Finally, the press release announcements were reviewed
to determine the securities issuance structures o f the ESOPs.
Descriptive statistics on ESOP-size and firm-size (Table 1), the distribution of
ESOP structures by year (Tables 2 and 3), and the distribution of ESOPs by SIC code
(Table 4) are provided for informative purposes. The more notable values o f Table 1
are found by comparing the sample of 60 takeover-related ESOPs to the 255 non
takeover firms. In particular, the dollar value and percentage size o f the ESOP appear
to be larger for firms announcing ESOPs in the presence o f takeover activity.19 These
results are, therefore, consistent with the argument that the managers o f "takeover"
firms are more concerned with increasing their level o f entrenchment.

'“Basing the takeover stratification on a review o f the one-year period prior to the ESOP
announcement is consistent with the methods employed by Chang and M ayers (1992).
'’The mean (median) dollar value o f the ESOP is $114,083,000 ($38,720,000) for takeover ESOPs,
and $68,424,000 ($10,000,000) for non-takeover ESOPs. Similar results are found for "ESOP-size",
a variable equal to the ESO P’s value divided by firm value. F or the ESOP dollar value variable, there
is a .078 (.018) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means
t-test (W ilcoxon rank-sum test). For ESOP size, the corresponding difference-of-means probabilities are
.603 (.286).
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Table 1
Sample statistics for all firms announcing the establishment o f an ESOP between
1980 and 1993.
M kt
V a lu e 1

ESO P
V alue

ESO P
Size1

N

M ean

M edian

M ean

M edian

M ean

M edian

Total

315J

1515320

185666

76867

12900

.087

.056

T kvr

60

1420666

217713

114083

38720

.094

.064

N on-tkvr = NT

255

1537591

170713

68424

10000

.085

.052

Repurch (NT)

181

1570561

196781

72107

9500

.066

.049

Non-Rep (NT)

74

1456949

129792

60407

11429

.127

.066

CS

85

2084084

279562

85997

18000

.097

.059

CS Rep (NT)

39

2877657

360101

107878

32220

.085

.073

CS N on-Rep (NT)

46

1411273

222128

67764

14500

.106

.055

CPS

33

3639194

1481175

204204

125000

.100

.081

CPS R ep (NT)

25

3222292

1449471

183225

140000

.096

.084

8

4942014

3444356

112164

75000

.116

.055

LE

94

2662349

468898

120528

33075

.090

.066

L E R ep (NT)

65

2408275

579231

222264

31100

.077

.059

LE N on-Rep (NT)

29

3231825

354660

122530

44000

.116

.074

CPS Non-Rep (NT)

data) on the day o f the announcem ent.
2 ESOP Size = ESOP value ($000s) (per press release) divided by the m arket value o f the firm.
3 F our o f the 319 firms in the overall sam ple w ere deleted because o f insufficient m arket value data.
T k v r = Takeover.
N T = N on-takeover = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
R e p = R e p u rc h = ESOPs structured with repurchased equity.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued comm on stock.
Cl’S = ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity.
L E = L everaged ESOPs.
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Table 2
Distribution o f ESOPs, and their structures, by year.
Y ear

T otal

Tkvr

N on-tkvr

CS

C PS

R ep u rch

LE

1980

6

0

6

1

0

4

1

1981

2

0

2

0

0

2

0

1982

4

1

3

2

0

3

0

1983

2

0

2

1

0

0

0

1984

18

0

18

4

0

15

1

1985

22

5

17

9

0

14

5

1986

6

1

5

0

0

4

1

1987

41

14

27

13

1

29

15

1988

43

12

31

18

2

26

21

1989

95

24

71

35

37

66

51

1990

58

2

56

18

10

38

20

1991

10

1

9

1

2

9

3

1992

5

0

5

2

0

3

0

1993

7

0

7

3

0

6

2

Total

319

60

259

107

52

219

120

% of
Total

100

18.8

81.2

33.5

16.3

68.7

37.6

T k v r = ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
N on -tk v r = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
CPS = ESOPs structured w ith convertible preferred stock.
R e p u rch = ESOPs structured with repurchased equity.
L E = Leveraged ESOPs.
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Table 3

Distribution o f non-takeover ESOP structures by year.
Y ear

T otal

R e p u rch

CS

CPS

LE

1980

6

4

1

0

1

1981

2

2

0

0

0

1982

3

2

1

0

0

1983

2

0

1

0

0

1984

18

15

4

0

1

1985

17

10

8

0

5

1986

5

4

0

0

0

1987

27

21

7

0

8

1988

31

21

11

0

14

1989

71

52

28

23

40

1990

56

37

18

9

20

1991

9

8

1

1

3

1992

5

3

2

0

0

1993

7

6

3

0

2

Total

259

185

85

33

94

R epurch = ESOPs structured w ith repurchased equity.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
CPS = ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity.
L E = Leveraged ESOPs.
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Table 4

Distribution o f ESOP sample by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.
SIC*

Tkvr

1000

2

2000

N onTkvr

R epurch

CS

CPS

LE

T otal

% of
T o tal

7

3

5

2

3

9

2.8

18

32

37

22

15

27

50

15.7

3000

17

81

69

26

16

29

98

30.7

4000

4

27

20

16

2

16

31

9.7

5000

3

19

14

8

6

9

22

6.9

6000

12

72

61

21

10

30

84

26.3

7000

4

13

9

8

1

5

17

5.3

8000

0

8

6

1

0

1

8

2.5

9000

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Total

60

259

219

107

52

120

319

100

T k v r = ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
R ep u rch = ESOPs structured with repurchased equity.
CS = ESOPs structured with common stock.
CPS = ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity.
L E = Leveraged ESOPs.
1 Source: CRSP.
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Tables 2 and 3 indicate that employee stock ownership plans cluster in the 19871990 period, with 74.3 percent of the ESOP sample being initiated in these years.
Moreover, 107 o f the 120 (89.2 percent) ESOPs structured with leverage (Table 2)
were initiated in this period.

Increased takeover activity, the acknowledgement o f

ESOPs as a takeover deterrent, and the ESOP-related tax benefits are the often cited
reasons for the ESOP’s popularity in this period. Table 2 also exhibits that 47 o f 52
(90.4 percent) convertible preferred ESOPs were established in the 1989-1990 period.
Explanation of this "convertible preferred" observation is unknown. Finally, Table 4
reveals that 30.7 percent and 26.3 percent o f the ESOP sample are firms in the
Manufacturing Industries (SIC = 3000) and Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (SIC
= 6000) businesses, respectively.

Given the sizable number of firms with SICs of

3000 and 6000, ESOP concentration in these categories is not irregular.

3.3.2. Method of Analysis (Revised Asymmetric Information)
Based on Brown and W arner (1985), a standard event study is used to calculate the
market model prediction errors.

For the 120-day estimation period (t= -135, -16;

where t= 0 represents the press release date), individual daily returns are regressed onto
the corresponding equal-weighted daily market index returns20 to calculate the leastsquares market model parameters. The formal model is defined as:

Rn = aj + P A , . , + h t

(1)

“Daily returns are provided by the CRSP files.
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where:
Rjt, = rate o f return for security j on day t,
R^, = rate o f return for the market index on day t,
, = error term for security j on day t,
Oj

= intercept,

ify

= slope, or security j ’s sensitivity to Rmt.

Each firm ’s market model parameter estimates (a and #) are then used in
conjunction with the daily event window (t= -15, +15) market returns to calculate each
firm ’s daily expected return. For each day in the eventwindow, an individual firm’s
prediction error is calculated as the difference betweenthe firm ’s actual andexpected
daily return. Therefore, firm j ’s daily prediction error is calculated as:

PEU = Ru -

+W

(2 )

where:
PEj t = firm j ’s prediction error
aj

= intercept estimate,

j&j

= slope estimate,

on day t,

The average prediction error (APE) for all firms on day t is:

(3)

where N is the number o f firms in the sample.
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The average two-day cumulative prediction error (CPE) is the sum o f the daily
average prediction errors:

+1

CPE = £ APEt

(4)

t=o

Finally, to test whether a sample’s CPE is significantly different from zero, the test
statistic divides the CPE by the square root o f the product o f the estimation-period
variance and two, which is the number o f days in the CPE event-window (0, + 1 ). Also
note that the resulting test statistic requires the assumption that the estimation-period
residuals are uncorrelated across securities.

3.3.3. Method of Analysis (Firm Size/ESOP Size)
The degree of asymmetric information released by an announcement, as proxied by
the magnitude o f the prediction error, is hypothesized to be affected by the size o f the
ESOP and size o f the firm. As discussed in section 3.2.1, it is argued that ESOP-size
and the absolute value of the prediction error are directly related, while firm-size and
prediction error magnitude are inversely related. These effects are tested by regressing
the absolute value o f each firm ’s two-day (0, + l) prediction error onto firm-size and
ESOP-size explanatory variables.
The sample examined in this analysis is identical to the "asymmetric information"
sample described in section 3.3.1. The calculation of prediction errors is also identical
to that o f a previous section (3.3.2). The calculation o f the ESOP-size variable (ESj)
is the dollar value o f the ESOP (as reported in the press release announcement) divided
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by the market value o f the firm ’s equity (from CRSP). The firm-size effect (FS,) is
proxied by partitioning the ESOP sample into large and small firms, based on a
comparison of their equity’s market value to the median market value o f all
(NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq) CRSP firms.

Because the ESOP-size and firm-size

hypotheses relate to the magnitude of the market’s reaction, the absolute value o f each
firm ’s two-day (0, + l) prediction error is regressed onto the firm-size and ESOP-size
variables.
To test the hypothesis that ESOP size and the magnitude o f the market’s reaction
are directly related, the regression includes the ESOP-size independent variable defined
above.

It is further argued that the degree of information inferred to the market is

affected by the size o f the firm. In this analysis, the ESOP firms are compared to the
median size of all CRSP firms and categorized as "large" or "small."

An indicator

variable (FSj) is used to document the specific category with a value of one (zero)
assigned to firms with market values less than (greater than or equal to) the median
value.21 The indicator variable is also multiplied by the ESOP-size variable to proxy
the ESOP-size/firm-size interaction effect. Therefore, the asymmetric information "size
effect" model is defined as:

\PEj\ = p0 + P !*ESj + p 2*FSj + p ^(E Sj+ F Sp + ej

(5)

21Because theory provides no proper cut-off in size-related studies, a second commonly used cut-off
method is employed in this analysis. In addition to the "median" method described above, the size
analysis examines the upper (i.e ., large firms) and low er thirds o f the ESOP sample, as defined by their
market value. By excluding the middle third from the sample, the firm-size examination focuses on the
small-firm and large-firm extremes.
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where:
|PEj| = absolute value o f firm j ’s two-day (0, + l) prediction error.
ESj = size of firm j ’s ESOP (as a percentage of firm j ’s market value o f equity).
FSj = indicator variable (0 = large firm; 1 = small firm),
ej = error term.
A significant and positive /3X supports the hypothesis that firms announcing the
establishment or expansion of a large ESOP infer to the market a significant degree of
(positive or negative, depending on the ESOP structure) information about the true
value o f the firm. In contrast, small ESOPs reveal a low level o f private information.
Furthermore, a significant and positive

is supportive o f the hypothesis that small-firm

announcements have a larger impact on firm value because the firms possess, and the
announcements release, a higher degree of asymmetric information.
To determine the validity of the "magnitude" ("absolute value") contentions
discussed in section 3.2.1, a regression similar to equation 5 is performed. The only
difference is the firm s’ prediction errors, not absolute value o f the prediction errors,
are used as the dependent variable. Insignificant coefficients are predicted for this latter
regression. In formal terms:

PE. = p0 + p,*ES, + p 2*FSj + p 3*(ESj*FSp + e.

(6)

where:
PEj = firm j ’s two-day (0, + l) prediction error.
ESj = size o f firm j ’s ESOP (as a percentage of firm j ’s market value o f equity).
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FSj = indicator variable (0 = large firm; 1 = small firm),
ej = error term.

3.4. Results (Revised Asymmetric Information)
Based on an initial examination of ESOP structures comparable to those analyzed
by Chang and Mayers (1992), the majority of results (documented in Table 5)
corroborate their findings (discussed in section 3.1.1.). The only difference between
the two sets o f results pertains to the ESOP category o f previously unissued common
stocks. Chang and Mayers note a significant excess return of 0.94 percent, while the
Table 5 results display an insignificant prediction error o f -0.01 percent.

The

difference is probably caused by the fact that a larger percentage o f the Table 5 sample
was taken from a time-period (i.e., post-1987) where the use of ESOPs as an anti
takeover device was more definitively acknowledged by the market. A less positive
reaction is therefore predicted (all else equal).
Regardless, the significant 1.01 percent CPE for the total ESOP sample suggests
that, in general, an ESOP has a positive effect on shareholder wealth.

This is

consistent with the "tax benefit", "motivation", and "shareholder interests" hypotheses
described in sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, respectively.

Furthermore, the significant

positive CPEs o f 1.57 percent and 0.72 percent for ESOPs structured with repurchased
equity and leverage (respectively) are supportive o f the traditional asymmetric
information hypothesis. The insignificant market reaction to ESOPs structured with
previously unissued common stock, however, is not consistent with the traditional
asymmetric information argument.

Finally, ESOPs announced in the presence of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54

Table 5
Two-day (0, + l) average cumulative prediction errors for the total sample, and
various subsamples, o f ESOPs announced during the 1980-1993 period.
N

Ave.
C P E (%)

Z -sta t1

T -stat

R ange o f C PE
(%)

P e rc en t
Positive

-34.23 to 33.33

60.1***

319

1.01

5.809***

4.978***

60

-2.74

-6.395***

-5.979***

-34.23 to 9.57

23.3***

N o n ta k e o v e r= (NT)

259

1.89

9.525***

8.263***

-9.46 to 33.33

68.7***

R e p u rch (N T + T )J

245

1.57

7.677***

6.741***

-34.23 to 33.33

68.1***

L E (N T + T)

120

0.72

3.498***

2.619***

-22.30 to 12.66

61.7**

C S (N T + T)

107

-0.01

0.828

-0.076

-22.30 to 33.33

45.8

C P S (N T + T)

52

-0.18

-0.142

-0.504

-10.00 to 9.41

53.8

T otal
T a k e o v e r= (T )

*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.
Note: Significance o f the "P ercent Positive" colum n (i.e., significantly different from 50% ) is
determ ined by the W ilcoxon signed-rank test.
1 T he z-statistic is based on standardized daily prediction errors.
2 Includes all form s o f repurchases ( i.e ., open m arket, tender offer, and targeted repurchases).
L E = Leveraged ESOP.
C S = ESOPs structured with previously unissued comm on stock.
C P S = ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
N T = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
T = ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
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takeover activity exhibit a significant and negative CPE o f -2.74 percent. This suggests
that the entrenchment effects of the ESOP dominate any securities issuance asymmetric
information effects that may exist.
In contrast to the Chang and Mayers examination, the sample is stratified by the
ESOP’s "source/type/use" structure and presence/absence o f takeover activity.22 The
results o f the additional stratification appear to clarify the findings o f past ESOP
research and provide support for the revised asymmetric information hypothesis. In
particular, the presence of takeover activity and the addition of a simultaneous
repurchase announcement appear to have overriding negative and positive effect on the
market’s reaction, respectively.
The overriding negative effect is evident from the significant negative (positive)
shareholder wealth effects associated with ESOPs announced in the presence (absence)
o f takeover activity (Table 5). This suggests that the market views the additional ESOP
voting power as a legitimate takeover defense. These results are consistent with Chang
and Mayers (1992), Gordon and Pound (1990), and Beatty (1995).
In regards to the overriding positive effect of a simultaneous repurchase
announcement (in the absence of takeover activity), Table 6 shows that ESOPs
structured with common stock (convertible preferred stock) and a simultaneous nontarget repurchase announcement have a significant two-day average CPE o f 2.09
percent (1.74 percent). In comparison, common stock (convertible preferred) ESOPs
structured without a repurchase produce an insignificant -0.01 percent (weakly

“ Because the analysis o f the "presence o f takeover" category involves a small sample size, these
additional classifications (noted in Table 6) are only examined for the "absence" category.
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Table 6
Two-day (0, + l) average cumulative prediction errors (CPEs) for the various
nontakeover subsamples of ESOPs announced during the 1980-1993 period.
N

Ave
C PE (%)

Z -sta t1

T -stat

R ange o f C PE
(%)

P e rc e n t
P ositive

R e p u rc h

185

2.59

11.040***

9.870***

-9.46 to 33.33

76.7***

T a rg e t R ep

25

0.38

0.869

0.410

-8.18 to 11.29

56.0

N on-R ep

74

0.12

0.358

0.267

-8.18 to 19.25

4 8.6

LE

94

1.69

6.316***

5.739***

-7.25 to 12.67

73.4***

R e p u rch

65

2.56

7.586***

6.811***

-3.80 to 12.67

81.5***

N on-R ep

29

-0.02

-7.25 to 3.23

55.1

85

0.94

3.026***

2.469**

-7.58 to 33.33

56.5

R e p u rch

39

2.09

3.978***

3.931***

-6.37 to 33.33

66.7**

N on-R ep

46

-0.01

0.451

-0.070

-7.60 to 13.1

47.8

C S (w /out R ep
o r LE)

27

-0.01

0.548

-0.027

-7.60 to 13.1

40.7*

C PS

33

0.94

2.722***

2.428**

-5.59 to 9.40

69.7**

R e p u rch

25

1.74

4.087***

4.011***

-1.70 to 9.40

80.0***

N on-R ep

8

-1.54

-1.696*

-1.800

-5.59 to 0.71

37.5

C P S (w /out R ep
o r LE)

2

-2.74

-0.672

-0.969

-5.59 to 0.13

50.0

27

3.72

-2.39 to 12.66

88.9***

CS

L E & R ep (w /out
C S & CPS)

0.014

6.299***

-0.541

5.409***

* * • = Significance at the 1 percent level.
** = Significance at the 5 percent level.
* = Significance at the 10 percent level.
N ote: Significance o f the "Percent Positive” colum n (i.e., significantly different from 50% ) is
determ ined by the W ilcoxon signed-rank test.
1 T he z-stat is based on standardized daily prediction errors.
R ep
LE
CS
C PS

=
=
=
=

R e p u rc h = ESOPs structured with a sim ultaneous repurchase announcem ent.
Leveraged ESOP.
ESOPs structured with previously unissued comm on stock.
ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
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significant -1.54 percent) prediction error. In other words, the results o f the additional
stratification suggest that Chang and Mayers’ significant positive (insignificant negative)
prediction

errors

attached

to

ESOP/common

stock

(convertible

preferred)

announcements are driven by the presence of a simultaneous repurchase announcement.
In terms o f the asymmetric information hypothesis, the repurchase announcement
implies to the market that the managers believe that the stock is underpriced.
Furthermore, the insignificant market reaction to "common stock" ESOPs structured
without repurchased equity supports the revised asymmetric information hypothesis.
In other words, because management does not want to compensate their employees with
an overpriced security, a non-negative market reaction is expected. The larger negative
reaction to the "convertible preferred" ESOPs announced without a simultaneous
repurchase also supports the revised asymmetric information hypothesis.

For

convertibles, the market infers that management did not want to compensate their
employees with the overpriced common stock. The market, therefore, adjusts the stock
of the price downward.
Similar findings, and support for the revised hypothesis, are noted for leveraged
ESOPs in which a significant 2.56 percent (insignificant -0.02 percent) prediction error
is found when the event is announced with (without) a simultaneous repurchase of
outstanding common stock. In fact, the overall sample o f ESOPs established in the
absence o f takeover activity has a significant positive (insignificant negative) average
CPE of 2.59 percent (0.12 percent) when the ESOP is structured with (without) a non
target repurchase.

One may therefore infer that the results documented in Table 5,
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which are consistent with those of Chang and Mayers (1992), appear to be highly
affected by the presence of a simultaneous repurchase announcement.

That is, it

appears that the significance of the positive reactions associated with the announcements
of non-takeover ESOPs, common stock ESOPs, and leveraged ESOPs is mainly caused
by the dominating effect of the ESOPs structured with repurchased equity. The same
can be said for the insignificance of the convertible preferred ESOPs.
Three final stratifications, though relatively small in sample, also support the
contentions of the asymmetric information hypothesis.

Documented in Table 6 is a

significant positive reaction o f 3.72 percent for the 27 leveraged ESOPs constructed
with repurchased equity and no previously unissued common stock or convertible
preferred shares.

Having the largest average CPE o f all documented classifications

provides additional support to the hypothesis’ separate predictions o f a positive market
reaction to repurchased equity and private loan announcements. Finally, the separate
analyses o f ESOPs structured with common stock and convertible preferred stock (and
no repurchases nor leverage) produce average CPEs o f -0.01 percent and -2.74 percent,
respectively.

Though the small sample sizes o f twenty-seven and two weaken the

implications, the smaller insignificant prediction error o f the common stock grouping
is further support of the revised asymmetric information hypothesis.

3.4.1. Results (Firm Size/ESOP Size)
In addition to determining the firm-size classification (FSj) by comparing each
firm ’s market value to the median of all CRSP market values, a separate classification
is based on an examination o f the lower and upper thirds of the ESOP sample. The
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results of the "median" firm-size cut-off and "extreme thirds" cut-off are documented
in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. Model (1) o f each table regresses the absolute value
("magnitude") o f the two-day (0, + l) prediction error onto the size variables, while
regression (2) uses the signed prediction error as the dependent variable.
The size results documented in Table 8 generally support the "magnitude", ESOPsize, and firm-size hypotheses outlined in section 3.2.1. With respect to magnitude,
the insignificance of the F statistic for the signed prediction error model (regression (2),
p-value = .154), in contrast to the significant F value for the "magnitude" model
(regression (1)), supports the argument that because the negative and positive ESOPrelated market reactions offset each other, the absolute value o f the prediction error
should be used in the size analyses.
For the testing o f ESOP-size, the significant positive /S3 coefficient (Table 8,
regression (2); p-value=.0093) implies that for small firms, the market reaction
increases with the size o f the ESOP. Thus, the positive jS3 is consistent with prior nonESOP size hypotheses (e.g., Ross, 1977, and Miller and Rock, 1985). In contrast, the
insignificant j3, suggests that the market reaction for larger firms is unaffected by the
size of the ESOP.

Furthermore, the significant positive /J2 coefficient (p-value =

.0037) is consistent with the position that small firms possess a larger degree of
asymmetric information than large firms, as argued and reported in previous non-ESOP
research (e.g., Atiase, 1985, Dann, 1981, and Vermaelen, 1981).
In contrast to the ESj*FSj results documented in Table 8, and based on the median
cut-off examination, where mid-size firms are included in the examination, the results
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Table 7
OLS regression results relating the firm-size (based on a comparison o f market
values with the CRSP median) and ESOP-size effects to the absolute value o f the
two-day announcement prediction errors.
MODEL:
1) | PEj | = /30 + /3,*ESj + /32*FSj + /?3*(ESj*FSj) + ^
2)
PE, = jSp + jg.^ESj + ft-F S j + ff3*(ESj*FSj) + e,
(i)

(1)

(2)

(2)

V ariables

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P -V alue

Intercept

.0256

.0001

.0067

.2107

ESj

.0244

.4971

-.0484

.2836

FSj

.0236

.0026

.0177

.0706

ESj*FSj

-.0095

.8551

.0416

.5225

(1) = | PE | Model: (F Value = 5.21, P-Value = .002; R2 = .056)
(2) = PE Model: (F Value = 2.91, P-Value = .035; R2 = .032)

Table 8
OLS regression results relating the firm-size (based on the upper and lower thirds
o f the ESOP sample) and ESOP-size effects to the absolute value of the two-day
announcement prediction errors.
MODEL:
1)
| PEj | = ft, + 0 ,*ESj + 02*FS j + /?3*(ESj*FSj) + e,
2)
PEj = & + g^E S j + j8a*FSj + j ^ E S f F S j ) + ej
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

V ariables

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P -V alue

Intercept

.0244

.0001

.0117

.0456

ESj

-.0399

.2495

-.0789

.0710

FSj

.0101

.0037

.0006

.8883

ESj*FSj

.1076

.0093

.1155

.0265

(1) = | PE | Model: (F Value = 4.96, P-Value = .002; R2 = .054)
(2) = PE Model: (F Value = 1.77, P-Value = .154; R2 = .019)
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o f Table 7 do not support the firm-size/ESOP-size interaction hypotheses. In particular,
the /?3 coefficient o f regression (1) exhibits an insignificant p-value o f .8551.

The

regression (1) results o f Tables 7 and 8 therefore suggest that classifying mid-size firms
into small- and large-firm categories dilutes the ESOP-size effects argued for in this
analysis.

3.5. Conclusion
Prior research has led us to believe that ESOPs structured with previously unissued
common stock have a significant positive effect on shareholder wealth, while those
structured with convertible preferred equity have an insignificant effect.

Based on

additional stratifications o f the ESOP structure, the results noted in this essay suggest
that the findings are strongly affected by two factors, the presence o f takeover activity
and the simultaneous announcement of repurchased equity.
Consistent with previous literature, the results show that ESOPs announced in the
presence o f takeover activity exhibit a significant and negative market reaction. This
finding is supportive o f the managerial entrenchment effect (section 2.4). In contrast,
ESOP structures announced in the absence of takeover activity tend to have a non
negative effect on shareholder wealth. More specifically, for ESOPs structured with
previously unissued common stock, the dominating effect of a simultaneous repurchase
announcement is evidenced by a significant positive cumulative prediction error for
ESOPs structured with repurchased equity and an insignificant CPE for those without
repurchased equity. Similar evidence is noted for ESOPs structured with convertible
preferred equity. That is, "convertible preferred" ESOPs structured without (with) a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62

simultaneous repurchase announcement have a weakly significant negative (positive)
effect on shareholder wealth.
Though the positive outcomes associated with ESOPs structured with repurchased
equity are supportive of the traditional asymmetric information hypothesis, the finding
that common stock ESOPs announced without repurchased equity have a less negative
effect on shareholder wealth than convertible preferred ESOP announcements is exactly
opposite to prior non-ESOP securities issuance results.

This finding is, however,

supportive o f a revised asymmetric information hypothesis that contends that managers
are concerned with the welfare o f their employees when structuring the ESOP.23
In other words, the results are consistent with the contention that because
management does not want to issue an overvalued equity to the employees, ESOPs
structured with common stock will have a non-negative effect on shareholder wealth.
Furthermore, because ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity imply that
management did not want to issue (overpriced) common stock to the employees, a
negative reaction is expected.

Asymmetric information, a popular theory used to

explain the market’s reaction to securities issuances, is (in this revised form) therefore
applicable to, and supported by, the securities issuance structure o f an employee stock
ownership plan. Finally, the argument that small firms, and large ESOPs, possess a
higher level of asymmetric information is also supported by the results o f this essay.

23T h is c o n c e rn is c o n siste n t w ith th e a ssu m p tio n th a t E S O P s a re c re a te d to m o tiv a te th e e m p lo y e e s.
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Chapter 4
Essay Two: Insider Ownership

4.1. Introduction
Given the assumption that the ESOP-controlled equity will vote with management
if a hostile takeover is attempted, the purpose of this essay is to examine an ESOP’s
effect on shareholder wealth in relation to the assumed increase in managerial voting
power.

Because ESOPs do not directly affect the cash-flow level o f insider

(managerial) ownership, yet are assumed to increase the voting power o f management,
ESOPs allow for more direct tests o f the corporate control/insider ownership
hypotheses.24 "More direct" is documented because the Leland and Pyle (1977)
signalling hypothesis and Jensen and Meckling (1976) alignment o f interests hypothesis
do not apply to events such as ESOPs that change the firm ’s voting structure without
affecting the manager’s cash-flow ownership, the variable o f concern in both studies.
Specifically, Leland and Pyle suggest that the level o f a manager’s cash-flow
ownership and the value o f the firm are positively related. The authors argue that in
order to preserve their personal wealth, managers do not want a high degree of
ownership if their firm is overvalued. Conversely, a high level o f personal ownership
suggests that the managers are optimistic about the firm’s future cash flows. Similarly,

24The market for corporate control is hypothesized to (informally) exist for corporations/managers
interested in the right to manage corporate assets. Often times, this involves taking over firms that are
inefficiently run by another set o f managers (Manne, 1965, and Jensen and Ruback, 1983). One strategy
used to prevent such a buyout, and therefore allow the inefficient managers to maintain corporate control,
is to increase the managerial ownership (voting power) to a level sufficient to veto all takeovers.
Consistent with this scenario, this essay analyzes the connection between an E SO P’s effect on managerial
voting pow er and the change in shareholder wealth.
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Jensen and Meckling contend that a high level of cash-flow insider ownership enhances
the value o f the firm because it aligns the interests of the managers with those o f the
shareholders. The "alignment o f interests" increases firm value because it reduces the
managers’ incentives to "shirk" their duties and consume excessive perquisites. The
point to be made, however, is that cash-flow ownership, not voting power, is the
variable o f concern in Leland and Pyle and Jensen and Meckling. Thus, their theories
can not be applied to the analysis of ESOPs because the managers’ cash-flow ownership
is unchanged by an increase in ESOP ownership.25

The ESOP, however, does

increase the voting power controlled by management. How this change in voting power
affects the value o f the firm is the question addressed in this essay.
More specifically, the theoretical ownership-related effects pertinent to a change in
voting power, and therefore ESOPs, are related to the "shareholder interests" and
"managerial entrenchment" hypotheses. The shareholder interests hypothesis argues for
an increase in firm value with the establishment of an ESOP because the additional
voting power will be used by management to increase the premium o f an attempted
takeover.

Absent a block of insider ownership, it is assumed that the diverse

shareholder ownership is initially unable to form a cartel to procure an adequate
takeover premium. The shareholder interests hypothesis suggests that an increase in
managerial voting power allows management to act as a substitute for the cartel and

23The exception to this statement is if the ESOP is structured without repurchased equity. The new
shares would then dilute the managers’ cash-flow ownership percentage. In contrast, the use o f a
repurchase would in whole or part preserve the managers’ ownership percentage, depending on the size
o f the repurchase relative to the ESOP. Thus, consistent with essay one, this repurchase effect on
managerial ownership is a further positive signal to the market.
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negotiate a higher takeover bid for the shareholders. The resulting effect is a rise in
firm value when managerial voting power is increased.
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis contends that the value o f the firm is
harmed by an ESOP because the increase in voting power will be used by management
to prevent subsequent hostile takeover attempts, regardless o f the offered premium and
welfare o f the shareholders. In particular, managers who reach a level of voting power
sufficient to prevent all takeover threats are able to increase their perquisite
consumption without retribution.

For obvious reasons, the entrenchment effect is

particularly harmful to firms with an inefficient set o f managers.

Nevertheless, the

hypothesized outcome from the increase in managerial voting power is a decrease in
firm value.
The shareholder interests and managerial entrenchment hypotheses are closely
related to Stulz’s (1988) valuation model,26 which incorporates the probability of a
successful takeover and magnitude o f the takeover premium offered to the firm. Stulz
argues that firm value is enhanced by an increase in takeover premium, an effect that
increases with the rise in managerial voting power.

In contrast, an increase in

“ The outcomes predicted by the shareholder interests and managerial entrenchment hypotheses are
also consistent with the contentions o f H arris and Raviv (1988). In their model, the level o f managerial
ownership is related to three "value affecting" outcomes associated with the market for corporate control.
W ithin the group o f firms that are takeover targets, the subset o f firms with a low level o f insider
ownership (10) is likely to be successfully taken over. F or firms w ith medium levels o f 10, a proxy fight
is probable and the success o f the takeover is indeterminable. Finally, for firms w ith high IO,
management is firmly entrenched and, therefore, able to fight o ff the takeover. H arris and Raviv further
contend that the level o f insider ownership is determined by management via the decision-making process
o f maximizing the sum o f their perquisites and equity value. Nevertheless, the model predicts a(n)
decrease (increase) in firm value when high (low) 10 firms increase their level o f insider ownership.
Because the Stulz and Harris and Raviv predictions are similar, the remainder o f this essay will focus
on Stulz’s (1988) model.
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managerial voting power reduces the probability of a successful takeover, thus
decreasing the value of the firm. Due to the divergent effects, firm value is maximized
at a level of insider ownership where the benefit of the increase in premium equals the
cost o f the decrease in the probability o f a takeover. Detailed discussions o f Stulz’s
model are provided in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
The second essay analyzes the ESOP’s interaction with these ownership and
takeover-valuation

effects.

Unlike prior

insider ownership/takeover-valuation

examinations, it is argued that because some firms are highly unlikely to ever become
a takeover candidate (due to factors such as the firm’s financial structure and size), an
inclusion o f these firms in the analysis serves only to dilute the overall results. The
following examination, therefore, tests for the ownership effects o f an ESOP on two
separate groupings, firms "attractive"27 for takeover and firms in which a takeover bid
is highly unlikely (i.e., "unattractive" firms).
The framework of the second essay is founded on two propositions: 1) the effects
attributed to the "shareholder interests" and "entrenchment" hypotheses are noteworthy
only for firms with a sufficient level o f takeover attractiveness; and 2) the takeoverrelated effects will differ for attractive firms that fall into one o f three "pre- versus
post-" announcement levels o f managerial voting power.28 To be specific, it is argued
that "attractive" firms with a low level of voting power prior to the ESOP will have a
negative (positive) market reaction if the post-level o f voting power is determined by

2T h e attractive category consists o f ESOP firms that exhibit financial characteristics sim ilar to those
o f non-ESOP firms that received a hostile bid in the 1987-1993 period (sections 4.1.3 and 4.3.1).
^M anagerial voting power is defined as the sum o f the insider and ESOP ownerships.
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the market to be "high" ("low").29 In terms o f Stulz, the negative (positive) reaction
is predicted because the cost o f the decrease in takeover probability exceeds (is less
than) the benefit of the increase in takeover premium associated with the rise in aligned
ownership. Finally, firms with a high pre-announcement level o f insider voting power
will experience reactions that differ from those of firms with a low pre-announcement
level o f voting power.

In fact, it will be argued that these firms with a high pre

announcement level should be categorized as "unattractive for takeover" because the
probability o f receiving a hostile takeover offer is constantly low (due to entrenchment),
regardless o f the change in managerial voting power.

4.1.1. Stulz (1988)
Stulz’s (1988) theoretical model demonstrates that the percentage o f votes controlled
by management has a significant effect on firm value because it directly affects the
likelihood o f a takeover attempt and magnitude of the associated takeover premium.
As the control percentage is increased, the benefit (i.e., increase in firm value) o f an
enlarged takeover premium and the cost o f a decrease in takeover probability affect the
value o f the firm.

The model further contends that firm value initially rises as the

control percentage increases because the "takeover premium" benefit exceeds the
"probability" cost. As the control percentage continues to rise, the cost will eventually
exceed the benefit, and firm value will drop.

“ "High" is defined as the level o f insider votes sufficient to prevent a hostile takeover (based on the
state o f incorporation and corporate bylaw supermajority provisions) and "post" refers to the time-period
subsequent to the ESOP announcement.
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Because ESOPs are assumed to increase the percentage o f votes controlled by
management, Stulz’s model suggests that the establishment o f an ESOP will alter the
value o f the firm. In other words, the probability o f a firm being successfully taken
over and the magnitude o f the takeover premium are affected by the announced ESOP.
For example, Stulz’s model predicts that a firm with a low percentage o f insider
ownership will have a positive market reaction to the announcement o f an ESOP funded
with voting equity. This overall effect is believed to occur because the benefit o f an
increased takeover premium will exceed the cost o f the reduced probability o f a
successful takeover.

The model also predicts that a firm with a high percentage of

insider ownership will experience a negative wealth effect when an announced ESOP
is funded with shares of voting equity. The negative reaction is predicted because the
cost of a reduced probability o f takeover exceeds the gain from an increase in the
required takeover premium.
In addition to the ESOP-related research discussed in the following section (4.1.2.),
several empirical studies examine the insider ownership/firm value relationship. For
example, Wruck (1989) examines the relation between the level o f insider ownership
and the market’s reaction to a private equity announcement. In addition, Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a)
(MSV) analyze the relation between corporate performance and insider ownership.
Wruck and MSV find positive (negative) effects for firms with insider ownership
percentages below 5 percent (between 5 and 25 percent). Though the insider ownership
percentages are lower than hypothesized, these results are consistent with the arguments
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of Stulz. McConnell and Servaes’ results suggest that a firm ’s value is maximized with
a far greater percentage o f insider ownership (approximately 37 percent for their
analysis o f 1986 firms), and Demsetz and Lehn note that insider ownership has no
relationship with the firm’s accounting rate of return. In sum, no definitive relation
between firm value and the level of insider ownership is provided by their results.
Moreover, a "chicken and the egg" problem arises in their studies. The authors
imply that it is the level o f insider ownership that affects the value o f the firm. Given
their analysis of firm value and insider ownership focuses on a single point in time, it
is equally acceptable to say that it is the value o f the firm that is affecting the level o f
insider ownership. In other words, it is possible that the managers determine their level
o f ownership based on the value of the firm, as suggested by Leland and Pyle (1977).
4.1.2. Revising the In terp retatio n s of Stulz
Chang and Mayers (1992) and Dhillon and Ramirez (1994) are among those that
have performed empirical tests in which the level of insider ownership (10) prior to an
ownership-increasing event (e.g., an ESOP announcement) is the key explanatory
variable. Thus, it appears that many interpret Stulz’s model as a prediction that for
firms with a low (high) level o f pre-announcement insider ownership, the magnitude
of the insider ownership increase and the size o f the positive (negative) market reaction
are directly related. They further imply that this expectation will hold irrespective of
the level o f post-announcement insider ownership. Essay two contends that the levels
o f pre- and post-insider ownership are the critical explanatory variables related to the
ownership/corporate control effects. For example, if an event transforms a "low 10"
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firm into a "high 10" firm, a negative market reaction is predicted because the cost of
the reduced probability of a takeover will now exceed the benefit o f a rise in the
takeover premium.

This is counter to most studies that predict a positive reaction

because o f the initially low level of insider ownership.
A second contrast to the typical Stulz interpretations is the contention that firms
with a high level of insider ownership throughout the event analysis (i.e., pre- and
post-) will be unaffected by the insider ownership/corporate control effects related to
a change in voting power. This argument is based on the notion that the market has
already accounted for the entrenchment effect that existed prior to the voting power
increase.

In other words, a "high-IO" firm that announces an ownership-increasing

event will be insignificantly affected by the entrenchment effect because the firm is
effectively "unattractive" for takeover. A typical Stulz interpretation would predict a
negative market reaction when insider ownership is increased by firms with an initially
high level o f voting power.
In contrast to the format of this essay’s insider ownership examination, the structure
o f the ESOP ownership analyses performed by Chang and Mayers and Dhillon and
Ramirez does not directly account for the post-announcement ownership levels.
Regardless, Chang and Mayers claim to support Stulz’s model with their regression of
ESOP announcement prediction errors onto a set of interaction variables composed of
the magnitude o f the ESOP and an indicator variable with a value (of zero or one)
based on the level of insider ownership prior to the ESOP. The "magnitude" is defined
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as the size o f the ESOP,30 and the indicator variable corresponds to one o f five pre-IO
levels (below 10%, 10%-20%, 20%-30%, 30%-40%, and above 40%).

Weakly

consistent with Stulz is their finding that all coefficients attached to the four interaction
variables with IOs below 40 percent were positive, while the "above 40 percent"
coefficient was negative.
The support is "weakly consistent" because, of the five separate regressions
performed on their data, only the "10%-20%" coefficient was significantly positive.
Furthermore, only one o f the five regressions had a significant negative (at the 10
percent level) "above 40%" coefficient. For clarity, one interpretation o f their results
is that for firms with a pre-IO between 10 and 20 percent, as the size o f the ESOP
increases, the magnitude of the positive market reaction (on the day o f the ESOP
announcement) also rises. Moreover, for firms with managerial ownership in excess
o f 40 percent, the size of the ESOP and the magnitude o f the decrease in shareholder
wealth move in the same direction. It should be remembered, however, that the 10
percent incremental cut-offs (for the indicator variables) are purely subjective and the
results are relatively weak. Essay two improves on this process by employing a more
objective cut-off measure, accounting for the pre- and post-announcement levels of
managerial power, and differentiating between ESOP firms that are attractive and
unattractive for takeover.
Irrespective of the Chang and Mayers results, this essay asserts that the firm ’s post
announcement ownership level (i.e., pre-IO plus ESOP ownership) must also be

•“ Calculated as a percentage o f shares outstanding.
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specifically accounted for in the ESOP/Insider Ownership research. To point out the
importance o f this accountability, consider the results predicted by Chang and M ayers’
regression for a firm with a pre-IO level of 10 percent and a 3 percent ESOP, and a
firm with a pre-IO level o f 17 percent and a 10 percent ESOP. Given the larger ESOP
size and a pre-IO between 10 and 20 percent, the "17%" firm is predicted to have a
significantly larger positive effect on shareholder wealth, regardless o f the post
announcement level o f insider ownership. In contrast to the regression’s predictions,
given that very few tender offer takeovers transpire when the level of insider ownership
exceeds 20 percent (per Bradley and Kim, 1985), essay two predicts a negative market
reaction for the " 17% pre-IO" firm when an ESOP is announced. Despite the low level
o f pre-announcement insider ownership, this result is expected because the takeover
probability is greatly reduced.
A similar analysis is performed by Dhillon and Ramirez (1994) who regress the
firm s’ prediction errors onto two "pre-IO"/"ESOP magnitude" interaction variables.
Their pre-IO indicator variables (with values of 0 or 1) account for the insider
ownership levels above and below 15 percent. The results demonstrate that the "below"
("above") coefficient was insignificantly positive (significantly negative). Thus, for
firms with a pre-announcement IO level in excess of 15 percent, the size of the ESOP
and the effect on firm value are inversely related. In addition to the "pre- versus post-"
IO problems (as described above), the Dhillon and Ramirez (DR) and Chang and
Mayers (CM) results appear to conflict. That is, the CM (DR) regression produces a(n)
significant (insignificant) positive coefficient for low levels o f pre-IO, and an
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insignificant (significant) negative coefficient for high levels of pre-announcement IO.
Taken as a whole, the conflicting results and unfocused method o f past ESOP/IO
research demonstrate the importance of an examination that accounts for the interactions
between the pre- and post-levels o f voting power and the corporate control effects of
attractive/unattractive firms.

4.1.3. Takeover Attractiveness
Stulz also suggests that the "attractiveness" of a firm as a takeover target affects the
premium and probability o f takeover and, therefore, the predicted value o f the firm.
This essay asserts that the probability o f takeover attached to a highly unattractive firm
is unaffected by an increase in insider or ESOP ownership because its pre- and post
announcement values are constantly close to zero. The zero probability is based on the
argument that no bidder considers them a valid target. On the other hand, an attractive
firm will have a takeover premium and probability that are highly dependent on the
levels o f insider and ESOP ownership. Given these differences, it is argued that past
insider ownership studies have produced diluted results because the attractive and
unattractive firms are pooled together. Furthermore, the resulting averages camouflage
the hypothesized significant ownership effects attached to the attractive firms.
The arguments noted above, however, assume that the market is able to
differentiate between firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover.

Prior

empirical research suggests that there are differences between firms targeted for
takeover and firms absent o f takeover activity. Wansley, Roenfeldt, and Cooley (1983)
perform a discriminant analysis on merged and randomly selected non-merged firms.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74

The findings outline a financial profile in which the "merged firms generally have
smaller price-eamings ratios, use less debt, are smaller, grow more rapidly, and have
less market value of equity in relation to book value o f assets" than the non-merged
firms.
Similarly, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988b) compare firms subject to hostile
takeovers, corporations involved in friendly mergers, and nontarget firms. The findings
suggest that, relative to the nontarget firms, the "takeover" firms are significantly
smaller in size. In addition, the firms that experience a hostile takeover typically have
a lower percentage, and dollar value, o f equity owned by top management. Based on
the assumption that markets are relatively efficient, one can further assume that
investors are aware of, and account for, the differences between firms that are attractive
and unattractive for takeover.

4.1.4. Determination of the "High"/"Low" Levels of Voting Power
Because this essay is concerned with the voting power of management, the level of
insider ownership must be adjusted for the differences in the percentage o f votes
necessary to prevent a takeover. These differences are attributed to a firm ’s, and its
state of incorporation’s, supermajority provisions. In other words, due to the varying
state laws and corporate bylaws addressing the ownership approval of hostile takeovers,
determination o f a "high" and "low" level of insider ownership is somewhat ambiguous.
For example, state law requires that a minimum of 15 percent of a firm ’s nonaligned
(i.e., non-insider) shares vote against a hostile takeover in order to effectively deter the
takeover o f firms incorporated in Delaware.

In comparison, California-based firms
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need a minimum o f 50 percent of the aggregate votes to prevent a takeover.
Furthermore, several corporations have supermajority provisions requiring that 67 to
90 percent o f the outstanding votes be cast in favor o f the takeover.

Without such

approval, the takeover is defeated.
Despite the supermajority differences across states and corporate bylaws, past
insider ownership/corporate control research has treated these voting provisions as if
they were identical for all firms. For example, prior research would consider two firms
with 15 percent insider ownership as having identical corporate control/insider
ownership effects regardless o f the presence o f differing state of incorporation or
corporate bylaw supermajority provisions.
In support o f these contentions, previous literature suggests that the market accounts
for the effects related to an announced change in the firm ’s, and its state of
incorporation’s, supermajority provisions. Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) examine the
announcement-day price effects of firms incorporated in states announcing a
supermajority (control share acquisition) law.

As a demonstration o f the implied

importance o f this supermajority adjustment, 15 states have adopted a control share
acquisition law between

1982 and

1987.

For the firms incorporated in a

"supermajority" state, the authors find a significant negative announcement-day effect
on shareholder wealth.

This supports the contention that the voting power of

management is effectively increased to a level approaching entrenchment.

More

important, it suggests that the state of incorporation’s supermajority provisions should
be accounted for when examining the effect of voting power on the value o f the firm.
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Similarly, previous empirical studies support the contention that insider ownership
research should account for the firm-specific supermajority provisions. In particular,
Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) examine the stock price reaction to the announcement of
several firm-specific anti-takeover provisions, including the supermajority amendment.
Once again, the significant negative market reaction to the announcement suggests that
the voting power of management is effectively increased to a level approaching
entrenchment.

It also supports the argument that corporate control and insider

ownership analyses should adjust for the presence o f a firm ’s supermajority provision.
The specifics regarding how a firm’s insider ownership is adjusted for these
supermajority provisions are discussed in section 4.3.2.

4.2. ESOP/Insider Ownership Hypotheses
Similar to previous literature, the general purpose of essay two is to examine the
effect o f ESOPs on a firm ’s managerial voting power and, in turn, on the value o f the
firm. Unlike prior analyses, however, this study uses a measure o f managerial voting
power that accounts for the state of incorporation and firm-specific supermajority
provisions. The importance of this measure is implied by the significant and negative
shareholder wealth effects associated with firms incorporated in a state that announced
a supermajority provision (Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989) and firms that announced a
firm-specific supermajority amendment (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987).

The negative

results presumably reflect the market’s belief that the managers’ voting power is
enhanced to a level that approaches entrenchment.
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A second material difference between this and previous studies is the classification
of the ESOP sample into firms that are "attractive" and "unattractive" for takeover.
Because prior analyses (e.g., Wansley, Roenfeldt, and Cooley, 1983, and Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988b) suggest that there are characteristic differences between
target and nontarget firms, and given the fact that the shareholder interests, managerial
entrenchment, and Stulz-related hypotheses are takeover-related, a stratification by
takeover attractiveness appears warranted. Without a separate analysis o f attractive and
unattractive firms, it is hypothesized that the insignificant unattractive effects dilute the
significant insider ownership effects associated with ESOP firms that are attractive for
takeover.
A final difference between the essay two analyses and prior ESOP research is the
inclusion of pre- and post-announcement managerial voting power variables.

By

accounting for the degree o f managerial voting power subsequent to the ESOP
announcement, a correct interpretation of Stulz’s (1988) valuation model is possible.
Previous empirical research (e.g., Chang and Mayers, 1992, and Dhillon and Ramirez,
1994) implicitly focuses on the firm ’s probability of takeover and associated takeover
premium that exists prior to the ESOP announcement. Conversely, this essay accounts
for the differences in the level o f the managerial voting power between the pre- and
post-announcement periods.

To be specific, the analyses classify the pre- and post

levels o f voting power as "low" or "high", depending on the percentage of votes
necessary to veto a takeover and the percentage of votes controlled by management.
For example, firms with a percentage o f insider-controlled votes in excess o f the
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percentage required to veto a takeover are classified as having a high level of
managerial voting power.
By combining the three analytical improvements noted above, the following
hypotheses are tested in essay two:
8) The market will react negatively to the announcement of an ESOP that increases a
firm ’s managerial voting power from "low" to "high."
9) A positive market reaction is predicted for ESOPs announced by firms with a "low"
pre- and post-announcement level of managerial voting power.
10) The effects predicted in 8) and 9) are only significant for firms that are attractive
for takeover.
The negative reaction predicted in (8) is consistent with the managerial
entrenchment hypothesis and a Stulz interpretation that contends that the cost o f the
decrease in the probability of takeover exceeds the benefit of an increase in the
magnitude of the takeover premium. The positive effect predicted in (9) supports the
shareholder interests hypothesis and the argument that the cost o f a decrease in takeover
probability is less than the benefit of an increase in takeover premium.

Finally,

hypothesis (10) states that the effects predicted in (8) and (9) are only significant for
ESOP firms that are attractive for takeover.

Because the shareholder interests,

managerial entrenchment, and Stulz-related hypotheses are predominantly based on the
effects o f takeover activity, it is argued that the unattractive firms are not affected by
a change in managerial voting power.

4.2.1. Blockholder/Institutional Ownership Hypotheses
The efficient-monitoring hypothesis predicts that firm value and institutional
ownership are positively related as a result of the high-quality, low-cost monitoring of
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the firm provided by institutional owners (Pound, 1988).

McConnell and Servaes

(1990) support this contention with their regression results that note a significant
relationship between the percentage o f institutional ownership and Tobin’s q, a firmvalue proxy. The increase in managerial voting power (from the ESOP creation), and
its effect on the institutional owners’ monitoring effectiveness, are also examined in this
essay. To be specific, it is hypothesized that the increase in managerial voting power
negates the effectiveness of the outsiders’ (i.e., blockholders’ and institutional owners’)
monitoring. It is further argued that the magnitude of the negative outcome (from the
decrease in monitoring effectiveness) is a function of the level o f outside ownership and
the ESOP’s contribution to the voting power of management.
Brickley, Lease, and Smith’s (1994) analysis of the voting process o f managementsponsored anti-takeover amendments examines several hypotheses, two o f particular
relevance to this study.

First, the blockholder-participation hypothesis asserts that

"blockholders [and institutional owners] are more active in the voting process than nonblockholders." Second, the blockholder opposition hypothesis states that "blockholders
(including financial institutions) are more likely than non-blockholders to oppose
managers on value-reducing proposals." Evidence from their analysis is consistent with
both hypotheses. One interpretation o f these findings is that institutional owners and
blockholders perform a value-enhancing monitoring service to the shareholders of the
corporation. In other words, because management is aware o f the institutional owners’
and blockholders’ active participation, a reduction in agency costs ensues.
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In relation to managerial voting power, however, if management has reached a level
of entrenchment, the monitoring effect is eliminated because the institutional investors
and blockholders have no power, regardless of their participation and opposition. With
this in mind, the purpose of the following analysis is to determine whether the market
accounts for the hypothesized loss in value caused by an increase in managerial voting
power (from the ESOP) and associated decrease in effective monitoring.
With respect to ESOPs, Chang and Mayers (1992) alternatively argue that
institutional blockholdings act as a complement to, or substitute for, the votes controlled
by management. Their explanations are limited and vague, however, and their testing
is unfocused.

O f the twenty-plus coefficients produced in the Chang and Mayers

regressions, seven represent the effects attributed to various ownership categories. That
is, the ownership percentages o f institutions, institutional blockholders (where
blockholder is defined as an investor with an ownership level in excess of 5 percent),
employee benefit plan blockholders, officer blockholders, outside director blockholders,
outside blockholders, and the CEO are used as separate explanatory variables.
Several points should be noted. First, the sum o f the CEO, officer blockholder,
and outside director ownership percentages should have a high correlation with Chang
and Mayers’ insider ownership (IO) interaction variables (described in section 4.1.2),
thus allowing for a collinearity problem in the regression. Second, the two ownership
coefficients that are significant among the seven analyzed by Chang and Mayers appear
to be in conflict.

That is, the significant positive and negative coefficients o f the
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"institutional holding" and "institutional blockholding" percentages (respectively)
provide an element of confusion with their opposite signs.31
Finally, the overall format o f Chang and Mayers’ institutional and blockholder
ownership variables does not appear to accurately test the ownerships’ relationship with
the m arket’s reaction to an ESOP announcement.

For example, why is an inverse

relation (or any relation) expected between the prediction error and the ownership level
of the institutional blockholder when an ESOP is announced? In contrast, this essay
suggests that firms with high levels o f institutional/blockholder ownership experience
a negative announcement effect i f the insider’s voting power has reached a level of
entrenchment that negates the positive monitoring effects of the blockholder. Such a
hypothesis is not empirically tested by Chang and Mayers. Their results merely suggest
that regardless of the level of managerial voting power, the prediction errors and
blockholder percentages are negatively related.
In sum, this essay contends that ESOP firms with a low pre- and post- (low preand high post-) level of managerial voting power will experience a non-negative
(negative) effect because the benefit o f the increased takeover premium exceeds (is less
than) the cost o f a reduced takeover probability and monitoring effect. Though the
direction o f these effects is predicted irrespective of the level o f institutional ownership,
it is further hypothesized that the negative effect will rise with the size of the
blockholder/institutional ownership percentage because of an increasing reduction in

31W ith little explanation, the authors suggest that "complementarity" and "substitute for managerial
vote control" effects are the cause. W hy two sim ilar proxies for the effects o f institutional ownership
produce differing results is puzzling, however.
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monitoring value when management becomes entrenched.

In other words, an

examination of the monitoring effects (in relation to an ESOP announcement) must also
incorporate the pre- and post-levels of managerial voting power.
To perform the examination, the ESOP sample is first split into firms with high and
low levels o f institutional/blockholder (outside) ownership. The classification of "high"
and "low" levels o f outside ownership is determined by comparing the outside
ownership percentage of a firm to the median o f the sample.32 A significantly larger
negative effect is predicted for firms with a high level of outside ownership that
announce ESOPs that change the level o f insider ownership from "low" to "high."
In other words, prior to the ESOP announcement, a firm with a high level of
outside ownership is hypothesized to have a larger takeover premium than a firm with
a low level of outside ownership, all else equal. The larger premium is a result of the
assumption that the institutions are more informed and, therefore, less likely to accept
a takeover bid unless an adequate premium is offered. Furthermore, the benefit o f this
increased premium (and increase in monitoring) is effectively negated when the firm
has an entrenched level o f insider ownership. Therefore, a significant negative effect
is predicted when an ESOP changes a firm with a high level o f outside ownership into
a "low-to-high IO" entity.

The blockholder/institutional ownership hypothesis is

formally listed as follows:
11) Firms with a "high" level o f outside ownership will experience a significantly
larger negative effect (relative to "low" firms) when an announced ESOP increases the
managers’ voting power from "low" to "high."

32Because CD-Disclosure (the source o f this data) is unavailable prior to 1987, the following analysis
is performed on ESOPs established or expanded after January 1, 1987.
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4.3. Data and Method of Analysis
4.3.1. Attractive versus Unattractive Firms
The method of analysis employed to support the contentions o f Stulz is a regression
of the firm s’ cumulative prediction errors onto varying ownership variables. Because
the regression is to be performed separately on ESOPs classified as attractive and
unattractive for takeover, the first step of this examination is to categorize the ESOPs
by takeover attractiveness. In order to perform such a task, a financial profile of nonESOP firms targeted for takeover in the 1987-1993 period is constructed in a manner
similar to that performed by Wansley, Roenfeldt, and Cooley (1983) (WRC). In their
examination, a discriminant analysis of merged and randomly selected firms (i.e., the
control group) is used to determine a financial profile o f each group.
In a similar manner, this essay uses a set of eleven financial calculations to separate
the ESOP firms into attractive and unattractive groupings.

One difference between

W RC’s and essay two’s analysis is the fact that the latter only examines firms subject
to a hostile takeover.

This is due to the corporate control, entrenchment, and

ESOP/Insider Ownership valuation effects being particularly associated with firms
experiencing a hostile takeover.
The initial sample of 154 hostile takeover firms33 is identified from a search of the
1987-1993 Nexis Newswire press releases.

Comparable to W RC’s examination, an

equal number o f control group (non-merged) firms is randomly selected from a listing

“ Identical to M orck, Shleifer, V ishny (1988b) (MSV), a hostile takeover is defined as one in which
"the initial bid for the target was neither negotiated with its board prior to being made n o r accepted by
the board as m ade." Unlike MSV, how ever, essay two examines all hostile takeovers, regardless o f the
bidder’s success or failure.
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o f CRSP firms. Unlike W RC’s procedures, control group firms that had a takeoverrelated press release announced during the 1987-1993 period are eliminated from the
sample to increase the likelihood that the control firms are not "attractive for takeover."
To determine the characteristics that differentiate the two groups, a discriminant
analysis is performed on the 11 variables calculated for the combined sample o f
takeover and control group firm s.34 The following is a list of the variables used in the
discriminant analysis. Variables one through five (six through nine) are comparable to
the significant variables use in W R C ’s (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny’s) examination.
Finally, the hypothesized relationship between each variable of interest and the level o f
attractiveness is documented in parentheses.35
1)

The natural logarithm of net

sales (inverse).

2)The book value of long-term debt divided by equity (inverse).
3) The price-earnings ratio (inverse).
4) The market value of equity divided by total assets (inverse).
5) The compound growth in net sales; equal to the geometric average growth rate for
the three years prior to the takeover attempt (direct).
6) The percentage o f common stock owned by the top two officers (inverse).
7) The percentage of common stock owned by all insiders (inverse).

34The firm’s year-end data for the period prior to the takeover (or control firm selection) date are
used to calculate the necessary financial variables. CD Disclosure is the source o f the financial data and
ownership inform ation. O f the 154 takeover firms initially located, 52 were eliminated due to insufficient
information (Final sample: 102 takeover and 104 control group firms).
35The purpose o f this analysis is to discriminate between the takeover and nontakeover firms. That
is, the direction o f the relationship is not specifically critical, but merely included for informational
purposes.
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8) The dollar value o f equity ownership o f the top two officers (inverse).
9) The log of the firm ’s total market value (inverse).
10) The quick ratio (i.e., acid test) (direct).
11) The times interest earned ratio (direct).
For descriptive purposes, Table 9 documents the mean value, and difference-ofmeans t-test p-values, o f the 11 variables calculated for the takeover and control group
firms.

Consistent with intuition and W R C ’s/MSV’s results, (in comparison to the

control group firms) the takeover firms have a significantly larger earnings per share
and significantly smaller percentage o f insider ownership.

Inconsistent with WRC,

however, are results that the takeover firms have a larger market value and a larger
level of prior year sales. These latter findings suggest that sizable firms are no longer
immune to the takeover process.
Linear discriminant analysis is performed on the 11 calculations, resulting in a
correct classification o f 85.3 percent (87 o f 102) of the takeover firms and 50.0 percent
(52 of 104) of the control group firms. The calibration information produced by the
discriminant analysis is stored and applied to the (1987-1993) sample o f ESOP firms
to classify them as "attractive" (i.e., firms that exhibit characteristics similar to the
group of takeover firms) and "unattractive." O f the 180 ESOP firms examined, the
linear discriminant analysis classified 108 as attractive. In support o f this analysis, it
should be noted that all ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity (essay
one) are classified by the discriminant analysis as attractive for takeover.

4.3.2. "High"/"Low" Levels of Managerial Voting Power
As previously described in section 4 .1 .4 , the determination o f low and high levels
o f managerial voting power must account for a firm’s, and its state o f incorporation’s,
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Table 9
Descriptive statistics (i.e., mean values) and difference-of-means t-test p-values for
the 102 takeover firms and 104 control group firms.

VARIABLE

TAKEOVER
G RO U P
1987-93

C O N TRO L
G RO U P
1987-93

T -TEST
P-VALUE
(diff.-of-means)

Total Assets

3,629,398,000

5,144,622,000

.362

EPS

2.489

0.761

.046

Log (sales)

13.48

12.55

.001

PE

31.53

-14.48'

.085

Mkt Val of Eqty

1,724,993,000

1,291,212,000

.343

Eqty/Assets

.823

.931

.693

Sales Growth

2.60

1.02

.410

Top Off. IO %

.019

.089

.001

Insider %

.087

.233

.001

Top Off. $ IO

8,344,000

24,334,000

.146

Log Mkt Value

12.95

11.93

.001

Quick Ratio

1.356

1.524

.628

TIE

6.903

5.642

.502

Dbt/Eqty Ratio

.535

.813

.333

1 Because a small negative EPS (the denominator of the PE ratio) produces an
extremely large and negative PE ratio, the mean o f the PEs may be an
inappropriate measure to examine via the difference-of-means t-test. Thus, a nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test is performed to test for a difference in median
values. A .601 p-value suggests that the PE variable is not significantly different
between the two groups.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87

supermajority provisions.

To adjust for the differences in provisions, the following

study employs an ownership ratio in which the denominator equals the percentage of
votes necessary to prevent a takeover.

Based on a comparison o f the state of

incorporation and corporate bylaw supermajority provisions, the smallest percentage
required to prevent a takeover is used as the denominator.

If no supermajority

provision exists, the denominator is .50 (i.e., 50 percent), the percentage o f votes
necessary for management to prevent a hostile takeover. The numerator o f the ratio
is equal to the actual percentage o f votes controlled by management.
Also note that because the 15 percent Delaware rule applies to non-management
ownership, the numerator is adjusted to only include the shares owned by non
management investors who typically vote with management (e.g., shares owned by an
employee stock benefit plan). The denominator is equal to the product o f 15 percent
and the percentage o f the firm’s nonaligned ownership.
In terms o f a typical interpretation o f Stulz’s model, a firm with a pre
announcement insider ownership (pre-IO) ratio close to zero should have a positive
reaction to the announcement of an event that increases the level o f insider ownership.
A typical Stulz interpretation also predicts that a pre-IO ratio in excess o f one should
lead to a negative reaction to such an event. In contrast, an application of essay tw o’s
"pre versus post" hypothesis predicts that a firm with a pre-IO ratio close to zero and
a post-IO ratio in excess of one will experience a negative market reaction.
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that the value of a firm with a pre- and post-IO ratio
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in excess o f one will not be affected by the ESOP-related change in voting power
because management was firmly entrenched prior to the announcement.
The final stage o f the low/high determination involves a comparison o f the ESOP
firm ’s 10 ratio to the 1987-1993 takeover firms’ 10 ratios (analyzed in the "attractive
versus unattractive" examination [section 4.3.1.]) to determine a proper low/high cut
off measure. O f the 102 non-ESOP takeover firms, only two had an 10 ratio greater
than .70. In addition, the five largest 10 ratios were .889, .762, .694, .677, and .675.
This suggests that managers of firms with 10 ratios in the .70 to .80 range are firmly
entrenched. To verify the accuracy of this range, 10 ratio cut-offs of .60, .70, .80, and
.90 are separately applied to the four regressions (described in section 4.3.3) employed
to determine an ESOP’s effect on managerial voting power and shareholder wealth.
The first regression uses an 10 cut-off of .60. Therefore, if an ESOP firm has a pre
announcement 10 ratio below .60, it is (implicitly) classified as a "low" pre-IO firm.
If the additional ESOP shares change the post-announcement 10 ratio to a value in
excess o f .60, it is classified as a "high" post-IO firm. Overall, the firm is classified
as a low-high firm.
In order to determine the 10 ratio, three pieces o f information are gathered: 1) the
state of incorporation’s supermajority provisions; 2) the firm-specific supermajority
bylaws (if any); and 3) the ownership structure o f the firm. The state o f incorporation
is recorded from CD Disclosure, and the states’ supermajority provisions (if any) are
provided in the details of the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s (IRRC’s)
analysis o f anti-takeover statutes. IRRC data is also used as the source o f firm-specific

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89

supermajority provisions. Finally, the firms’ ownership structures (i.e., management,
board o f directors, blockholders, and institutional ownerships) is gathered from CDDisclosure, a compact disc data storage of corporate information o f public companies
filing with the SEC. Because CD-Disclosure, the source o f a majority o f the data used
in this essay, is available only for the years 1987-1993, this insider ownership
examination is restricted to the 1987-1993 time-frame.

4.3.3. Method of Analysis (ESOPs and Insider Ownership)
In addition to the pre- and post-insider ownership percentages, the magnitude of the
change in ownership (i.e., the size o f the ESOP) should affect the size o f the price
reaction. For example, Stulz’s model would predict that for low-IO firms, the positive
market reaction increases as the magnitude o f the change in 10 rises. To account for
this factor, the difference between the "before" and "after" insider ownership ratios is
calculated (hereafter defined as &).
To summarize the empirical structure, a standard event study procedure is
employed to calculate the prediction errors of the ESOP announcements (section 3.3.2).
Once obtained, the two-day (0, + l) cumulative prediction errors (CPEs) become the
dependent variable of the following regression36 (separately performed on "attractive"
and "unattractive" firms):
CPEi = p , + P 2A , + P 3 *Z) + P 4(A ,* D ) + et

(7)

“ To test for non-constant error variances o f unknown form, W hite’s (1980) direct test for
heteroskedasticity is employed.
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where N is the number of firms in the regression, a is the percentage increase in the
managerial ownership ratio (previously described), and D is an indicator variable equal
to unity if insiders subsequently have the necessary votes to prevent a potential takeover
(zero otherwise).

In effect, an interaction variable (a^ D ) is used to test for a

difference in slopes between low-low firms (D = 0 ) and low-high firms ( D = l) .37 The
value o f D is based on a comparison o f the ESOP firm ’s 10 ratio to the "cut-off'
measure of the non-ESOP takeover firms’ 10 ratio, as described in the previous section.
Cut-off measures used in the four regressions are .60, .70, .80, and .90. With respect
to the hypotheses, it is predicted that the low-high (and attractive) firms will experience
a significant negative reaction that increases with the size o f the ESOP (i.e., /J4 < 0).
Furthermore, attractive firms with an insufficient level o f "veto" votes (i.e., lowlow firms) should receive an increase in shareholder wealth that grows with the size of
the ESOP (i.e., 0 2 > 0). Thus, the dummy variable interaction (i.e., a;*D) accounts
for the hypothesized change in the sign of the slope from positive to negative as the IO
ratio switches from "low" to "high." This change will theoretically occur when the
insider ownership percentage reaches a point where the benefit o f an increase in the
takeover premium no longer exceeds the cost of a decrease in takeover probability. In
sum, a significant positive /?2, in combination with a significant negative /?4, will
support the hypothesis that the post-insider ownership affects the level o f shareholder
wealth when an ESOP is announced.

3’The null hypothesis for the difference in slopes is H<,: 04 = 0, and the null hypothesis for the
difference in intercepts is H„: 03 = 0.
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Though these predictions are consistent with the managerial entrenchment and
shareholder interests hypotheses, it is further argued that they are results specifically
related to "attractive" firms. That is, because these hypotheses pertain to the firm ’s
takeover probability and premium, an unattractive firm should have a value that is
unaffected by the two takeover variables and any changes in ownership that affect these
variables. In order to test this contention, a similar regression is run on the category
o f unattractive ESOP firms. Based on the argument that the shareholder interests and
managerial entrenchment effects are lacking, the difference in slopes between
unattractive low-low and low-high firms should be insignificant (i.e., /?4 is
insignificantly different from zero). Recall that a significant difference is predicted for
a similar regression of attractive firms.

4.3.4. Method of Analysis (Stockholder and Institutional Ownership)
The purpose o f the following analysis is to test for an ESOP’s effect on the
outcomes predicted by the efficient-monitoring hypothesis (section 4.2.1).

This

hypothesis contends that firm value is enhanced by the presence o f blockholder and
institutional ("outside") ownerships because o f the low-cost, high-quality monitoring
services they provide.

It can also be argued that the magnitude of this monitoring

effect and the level of outside ownership are positively related. The final contention
is that a firm with an entrenched set o f managers will have insignificant monitoring
effects because the voting power of the outside shareholders is negated by the voting
power o f management. Given the assumed increase in managerial voting power from
the establishment o f an ESOP, it is hypothesized that firms with a high level of outside
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ownership will experience a significant drop in firm value (relative to firms with a low
level of outside ownership) when an ESOP is announced.

The drop is caused by a

substantial decrease in the blockholders’ and institutional owners’ monitoring
effectiveness.
To test this hypothesis, the insider ownership ratio regression (section 4.3.3,
equation 7) is separately performed on firms with low and high levels o f outside
ownership.

The hypothesized outcome is a /34 coefficient that is significantly more

negative for firms with a high level of outside ownership than for firms with a low level
o f outside ownership. A second sub-category of regressions is performed by splitting
the high and low "outside ownership" categories into attractive and unattractive
stratifications. It is hypothesized that the preceding predictions are only significant for
the attractive firms. That is, it is further predicted that the j84 coefficient is significantly
different only for the sample of attractive firms.

4.4. Results
In general, the results support half of Stulz’s (1988) model and the entrenchment
hypothesis. The portion of Stulz’s model supported by the findings is the contention
that for attractive firms with an initially "low" level o f managerial voting power, a
significant negative effect is predicted for ESOPs that increase the voting power to a
"high" level o f voting power. That is, the results support the argument that a negative
market reaction is expected for announced ESOPs that increase the managers’ voting
power to a level o f entrenchment.
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In contrast, no support is given to the shareholder interests hypothesis or the part
of Stulz’s model that predicts a positive market reaction for ESOP firms with a low
level of pre- and post-announcement managerial voting power. Thus, the results do not
support Stulz’s argument that the benefit of an increase in takeover premium (from the
ESOP-related increase in voting power) is greater than the cost o f the decrease in the
probability of a takeover.
Tables 10 through 13 each present the results for the original sets o f three
regressions, and differ by the cut-off point o f the IO-ratio.

Each table contains the

results from the overall regression of 180 firms, the regression o f the 108 attractive
firms, and the regression o f the 72 unattractive firms. Because a significant positive
intercept is observed in all 12 regressions (suggesting that a significant explanatory
variable is omitted), and based on the significant positive "repurchased equity" findings
noted throughout essay one, Tables 14 through 17 include a repurchased equity
indicator variable. Aside from shifting the significant positive effect from the intercept
to the indicator variable and increasing the explanatory power o f the regression (as
measured by R2), the results o f Tables 14 through 17 are comparable to those o f Tables
10 through 13.
The most notable results come from the regressions o f attractive firms that use a
low-high 10 cut-off measure o f .70 and .80 (Tables 11, 12, 15, and 16; equation 2).38
In particular, a significant negative effect is noted for attractive firms that announce an
ESOP that increases the level o f managerial voting power from "low" to "high" (per

“ Recall (from section 4.3.2) that the analysis o f non-ESOP hostile takeover firms suggests that
managers are firmly entrenched with IO ratios in the .70 to .80 range.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94

Table 10
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.60 cut-off).

MODEL: CPE; = j3, +

+

(1)

&*D + 0 4( a * D ) + e<
(2)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(3)

Variables

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Intercept

.024

.000

.019

.003

.047

.015

-.055

.157

-.039

.243

.028

.854

D

-.019

.069

-.030

.142

-.043

.052

A|*D

.046

.271

.034

.407

-.043

.895

A|

(1) = Total sample (180 firms)
(F Value = 2.19, P-Value = .0907; R2 = .036)
(2) = Attractive (108 firms)
(F Value = 3.01, P-Value = .0334; R2 = .080)
(3) = U nattractive (72 firms)
(F Value = 1.53, P-Value = .2155; R2 = .063)

Table 11
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.70 cut-off).
MODEL: CPE, = f t + (32* a -, + 03*D + 0 4( a * D ) + e,
(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P -V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.021

.002

.018

.004

.029

.070

-.037

.298

-.034

.282

.030

.803

-.014

.169

-.049

.015

-.021

.281

.026

.512

.047

.241

-.028

.821

D
a(*D

(1) = Total sample (180 firms)
(F Value = 1.73, P-Value = .1619; R2 = .029)
(2) = Attractive (108 firms)
(F Value = 4.37, P-Value = .0061; R2 = .111)
(3) = U nattractive (72 firms)
(F Value = 0.61, P-Value = .6089; R2 = .026)
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Table 12
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.80 cut-off).

MODEL: CPEi = 0, +

02*a , +

(1)

ft* D + /34(a*D) + e.
(2)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

In te rc e p t

.021

.002

.017

.004

.029

.056

A|

-.036

.221

-.029

.271

-.038

.622

D

-.015

.173

-.057

.016

-.023

.249

.025

.463

.049

.184

.045

.589

a ,*D

(1) = Total sample (180 firms)
(F Value = 1.70, P-Value = .1678; R2 = .028)
(2) = Attractive (108 firms)
(F Value = 4.26, P-Value = .0070; R2 = .107)
(3) = U nattractive (72 firms)
(F Value = 0.48, P-Value = .6944; R2 = .022)

Table 13
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.90 cut-off).
MODEL: CPEj = f t + j82*A; + /33*D + |84( a * D ) + e.
(1)

(2)

(1)

(3)

(2)

(3)

V ariables

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.022

.001

.019

.002

.031

.046

A

-.057

.038

-.053

.032

-.041

.607

D

-.014

.201

-.016

.504

-.026

.206

.048

.138

.038

.284

.054

.525

a ,*D

(1) = Total sample (180 firms)
(F Value = 1.88, P-Value = .1348; R2 = .031)
(2) = Attractive (108 firms)
(F Value = 2.52, P-Value = .0614; R2 = .065)
(3) = Unattractive (72 firms)
(F Value = 0.56, P-Value = .6466; R2 = .026)
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Table 14
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.60 cut-off) (Includes a repurchased equity indicator variable).

MODEL: CPE; = j8j + /?2*Ai + 0 3*D + 0 4(a*D) + 0 s*REP + e,
(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P -V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.004

.592

-.004

.641

.027

.193

Al

-.053

.157

-.039

.208

.090

.556

D

-.018

.084

-.028

.142

-.045

.034

a,*D

.045

.269

.029

.451

-.074

.633

REP

.028

.000

.032

.000

.034

.024

(1) = Total sample (180 firms)
(F Value = 5.52, P-Value = .0003;
= .112)
(2) = Attractive (108 firms)
(F Value = 7.41, P-Value = .0001; R2 = .223)
(3) = Unattractive (72 firms)
(F Value = 2.56, P-Value = .0466; R2 = .132)

Table 15
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.70 cut-off) (Includes a repurchased equity indicator variable).
MODEL: CPE; = f t + j32*Ai + 0 3*D -I- 0 4(a*D) + /35*REP + ej
(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P -V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.001

.876

-.002

.718

.001

.683

-.038

.276

-.037

.216

.055

.642

D

-.012

.236

-.047

.012

-.019

.305

Ai*D

.026

.496

.045

.218

-.046

.704

REP

.028

.000

.030

.000

.032

.028

(2) = Attractive (108 firms)
(3) = Unattractive (72 firms)

(F Value = 7.89, P-Value = .0001; R2 = .234)
(F Value = 1.75, P-Value = .1489; R2 = .096)
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Table 16
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.80 cut-off) (Includes a repurchased equity indicator variable).

MODEL: CPE; = 0, + 0 2 % + 0 3*D + 0 4(a * D ) + 0 3*REP -I- e,
(2)

(1)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(3)

Variables

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Intercept

.001

.914

-.002

.726

.007

.698

-.039

.161

-.032

.194

-.045

.548

-.011

.302

-.053

.017

-.020

.313

a,*D

.027

.392

.047

.175

.060

.458

REP

.028

.000

.028

.000

.033

.035

A|
D

(1) = Total sample (180 firms)
(F Value = 5.00, P-Value = .0008; R2 = .102)
(2) = Attractive (108 firms)
(F Value = 7.31, P-Value = .0001; R2 = .216)
(3) = U nattractive (72 firms)
(F Value = 1.54, P-Value = .2015; R2 = .088)

Table 17
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.90 cut-off) (Includes a repurchased equity indicator variable).
MODEL: CPE; = 0, + 02*Ai + 03*D + 0 4(a * D ) + 0 3*REP + e*
(2)

(1)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.001

.845

-.001

.817

.008

.671

-.055

.037

-.050

.032

-.047

.541

-.008

.429

-.016

.461

-.020

.311

a,*D

.044

.151

.034

.301

.066

.433

REP

.029

.000

.029

.000

.032

.043

D

(1 )'= Total sample (180 firms)
(2) = A ttractive (108 firms)
(3) = U nattractive (72 firms)

(F Value = 5 7 2 7 "^ V'alue = i0005; R2 = .107)
(F Value = 5.86, P-Value = .0003; R2 = .177)
(F Value = 1.51, P-Value = .2119; R2 = .089)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98

This is supportive o f the parameter estimate of the indicator variable, D). That is, the
parameter estimates (p-values) o f -.049 (.015), -.057 (.016), -.047 (.012), and -.053
(.017) from Tables 11, 12, 15, and 16, respectively, support the argument that the
market reacts negatively to an announced ESOP if it increases the managerial voting
power to a level o f entrenchment.

In contrast, similar significant effects are non

existent for the sample o f unattractive firms. Therefore, in addition to supporting the
managerial entrenchment, and "low-high" voting power, hypotheses, these results are
consistent with the argument that the market discriminates between firms that are
attractive and unattractive for takeover.
Finally, consistent with the findings of essay one, a significant positive effect is
noted for ESOPs structured with repurchased equity (Tables 14-17, variable REP).
This is supportive o f an asymmetric information argument that the market infers
positive news from the repurchased equity announcement because it suggests that
management believes the equity is undervalued.

4.4.1. Results (Blockholder/Institutional Ownership)
The majority o f institutional/blockholder ("outsider") ownership results are
unsupportive o f the general contention that an ESOP-related increase in managerial
voting power affects firm value by decreasing the outsiders’ monitoring effectiveness.
It is hypothesized that firms with a high level of outside ownership experience an
increase in shareholder wealth from the blockholder participation and blockholder
opposition effects (section 4.2.1). It is further argued that these positive effects are
negated by an entrenched set of managers. Based on the analysis and comparison of
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ESOP firms with low and high levels of outside ownership (external monitoring), the
results are predominantly insignificant.
Tables 18, 20, 22, and 24 provide the regression results for ESOP firms with a
high level of outside ownership and a low-high "entrenchment" cut-off o f .60, .70, .80,
and .90, respectively. A similar format is used for firms with a low level o f outside
ownership in Tables 19, 21, 23, and 25. It is specifically argued that the indicator
variable’s (D) and interaction variable’s (A*D) effects are significant and negative for
firms with a high level of outside ownership.

The negative reactions are expected

because the positive monitoring effects are negated by firms with a managerial voting
power that reaches a level of entrenchment.

Conversely, insignificant effects are

predicted for ESOP firms with low outside ownership.

Aside from a handful of

coefficients exhibiting a significant relationship with the firm s’ two-day (0, + l)
prediction errors, the results are unsupportive o f the blockholder/institutional ownership
hypotheses.
In addition to the possibility that no outside ownership effect exists, the insignificant
effects could be attributed to two additional factors. First, the method used to separate
the firms into low and high outside ownership categories is inadequate. In other words,
the process o f comparing each firm ’s level o f outside ownership to that of the sample
firm s’ median (to determine "low" or "high" outside ownership) could be greatly
improved if the median of all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq firms was used as the low/high
benchmark.

Unfortunately, time and data constraints do not allow for such a

procedure. Second, the further stratification o f the 117 attractive and 72 unattractive
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Table 18
OLS regression results relating the level of institutional/blockholder (outside)
ownership to the ESOP two-day announcement prediction errors (.60 cut-off)
(High external monitoring).
MODEL: CPEf = 0 , + 0 2*Aj + &*D + 0 4(a*D ) -I- e,
(1)

(D

(2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

Variables

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Intercept

.0195

.0038

.0212

.0084

.0073

.7323

-.0736

.0403

-.0787

.0501

-.1119

.3876

-.0207

.0976

-.0259

.2451

-.0090

.7337

.0613

.1208

.0685

.1439

.1064

.4349

D
a,+D

(1) = Total sample (86 firms)
(F Value = 2.53, P-Value = .0625; R2 = .084)
(2) = Attractive (65 firms)
(F Value = 2.58, P-Value = .0613; R2 = .112)
(3) = Unattractive (21 firms)
(F Value = 0.39, P-Value = .7641; R2 = .064)

Table 19
OLS regression results relating the level of outside ownership to the ESOP twoday announcement prediction errors (.60 cut-off) (Low external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE; = 0, + 0 ^ ; + 0 3*D + 0 4(a*D ) + e;
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

Variables

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Intercept

.0276

.0459

.0135

.2244

.0644

.1306

*1

-.0074

.9280

.0374

.5449

.0757

.8744

D

-.0213

.2330

-.0671

.3945

-.0574

.1982

.0108

.9003

.0183

.9004

-.0645

.8931

A|*D

(1) = Total sample (93 firms)
(F Value = 0.90, P-Value = .4454; R2 = .029)
(2) = Attractive (42 firms)
(F Value = 1.42, P-Value = .2532; R2 = .101)
(3) = Unattractive (51 firms) (F Value = 1.68, P-Value = .1849; R2 = .097)
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Table 20
OLS regression results relating the level o f outside ownership to the ESOP twoday announcement prediction errors (.70 cut-off) (High external monitoring).

MODEL: CPE; = 0 , + 0 2*Aj + 0 3*D + 0 4(a * D ) + e,
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.0153

.0264

.0192

.0133

.0022

.9016

-.0459

.1573

-.0623

.0837

-.0097

.9145

-.0133

.3063

-.0275

.2290

.0043

.8632

.0272

.4580

.0539

.2173

-.0184

.8557

D
a,+D

(1) = Total sample (86 firms)
(F Value = 2.15, P-Value = .1008; R2 = .073)
(2) = Attractive (65 firms)
(F Value = 2.42, P-Value = .0744; R2 = . 106)
(3) = Unattractive (21 firms) (F Value = 0.15, P-Value = .9313; R2 = .025)

Table 21
OLS regression results relating the level o f outside ownership to the ESOP twoday announcement prediction errors (.70 cut-off) (Low external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE; = 0, + 0 2*A; + 03*D + 0 4(a * D ) + e.
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P a ra m e te r
E stim a te

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.0244

.0564

.0134

.2229

.0285

.3525

.0068

.9313

.0374

.5437

.3521

.4078

D

-.0184

.2983

-. 1202

.0198

-.0181

.5922

a,*D

-.0028

.9729

.1025

.3549

-.3431

.4213

A|

(1) = Total sample (93 firms)
(F Value = 0 .7 8 , P-Value = .5108; R2 = .025)
(2) = Attractive (42 firms)
(F Value = 3.80, P-V alue = .0176; R2 = .226)
(3) = Unattractive (51 firms) (F Value = 1.04, P-Value = .3854; R2 = .063)
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Table 22
OLS regression results relating the outside ownership to the ESOP two-day
announcement prediction errors (.80 cut-off) (High external monitoring).

MODEL: CPE; = 0, +
(1)

+ 0 3*D -I- 0 4(a * D ) + e,
(1)

(2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

Variables

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Parameter
Estimate

P-Value

Intercept

.0144

.0285

.0171

.0208

.0066

.6918

Ai

-.0350

.2008

-.0465

.1363

-.0055

.9306

D

-.0191

.1816

-.0348

.2067

-.0030

.9065

.0200

.5410

.0455

.2754

-.0410

.6408

a,*D

(1) = Total sample (86 firms)
(F Value = 2.45, P-Value = .0693; R2 = .082)
(2) = A ttractive (65 firms)
(F Value = 2.35, P-Value = .0807; R2 = .102)
(3) = Unattractive (21 firms) (F Value = 0.36, P-Value = .7800; R2 = .064)

Table 23
OLS regression results relating the level of outside ownership to the ESOP twoday announcement prediction errors (.80 cut-ofi) (Low external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE; = 0 , + 0 2*a, + /33*D + /34(a * D ) + e ,
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.0261

.0253

.0159

.1239

.0455

.0645

-.0242

.6863

.0061

.9004

-.0766

.6586

-.0198

.2570

-.1209

.0274

-.0359

.2168

.0292

.6606

.1107

.2530

.0894

.6140

D
&i*D

(1) = Total sample (93 firms)
(F Value = 0.56, P-Value = .6425; R2 = .018)
(2) = Attractive (42 firms)
(F Value = 2.77, P-Value = .0540; R2 = .172)
(3) = Unattractive (51 firms) (F Value = 0.58, P-Value = .6343; R2 = .037)
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Table 24
OLS regression results relating the level o f outside ownership to the ESOP twoday announcement prediction errors (.90 cut-off) (High external monitoring).

MODEL: CPE, = 0, + j82*Ai + 0 3*D + 0 4(a * D ) + e.
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.0169

.0092

.0204

.0044

.0066

.6918

*1

-.0581

.0208

-.0736

.0080

-.0055

.9306

D

-.0160

.2762

.0101

.7899

-.0030

.9065

.0446

.1485

.0393

.3601

-.0411

.6408

a,*D

(1) = Total sample (86 firms)
(F Value = 2.53, P-Value = .0625; R2 = .084)
(2) = Attractive (65 firms)
(F Value = 3.03, P-Value = .0358; R2 = .128)
(3) = Unattractive (21 firms) (F Value = 0.36, P-Value = .7800; R2 = .0638)

Table 25
OLS regression results relating the outside ownership to the ESOP two-day
announcement prediction errors (.90 cut-off) (Low external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE, = 0, + j82*A, + & *D + /34(a * D ) + e.
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(3)

(3)

V ariables

P aram e ter
E stim ate

P -V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

P a ra m e te r
E stim ate

P-V alue

Intercept

.0261

.0240

.0142

.1904

.0465

.0572

-.0348

.5608

-.0009

.9861

-.0792

.6534

D

-.0179

.3133

-.0149

.6974

-.0383

.1953

Aj+D

.0396

.5519

-.0219

.7813

.1009

.5770

(1) = Total sample (93 firms)
(F Value = 0.41, P-Value = .7456; R2 = .013)
(2) = Attractive (42 firms)
(F Value = 0.72, P-Value = .5428; R2 = .048)
(3) = Unattractive (51 firms) (F Value = 0.62, P-Value = .6076; R2 = .042)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104

firms by their level of outside ownership reduces the size o f the sub-samples to the
extent that it is difficult to observe a relationship between outside ownership and an
ESOP’s effect on managerial voting power.

4.5. Conclusion
Regardless of the results, this essay is important because o f the three analytical
improvements it provides to the insider ownership/corporate control research. First,
it contends that the results o f this area o f research are only pertinent to firms that
possess qualities that make them "attractive" for takeover.

Including "unattractive"

firms (e.g., firms that are too large or unprofitable) into the analysis serves only to
dilute the overall effects. The findings of essay two support this argument with the
significant effects for attractive firms announcing an ESOP, and insignificant results for
unattractive ones.
Essay two also improves upon prior studies by specifically accounting for the
effects of a firm’s, and its state of incorporation’s, supermajority provisions on the
voting power o f management. Prior research considers firms with equal percentages
o f insider ownership to have an equal level o f managerial voting power. Essay two
contends that firms with supermajority provisions will have a stronger degree of
managerial voting power because of the smaller percentage o f votes necessary to
prevent a takeover. Thus, instead of using the percentage o f insider ownership as the
measure o f managerial voting power (as does all prior research), essay two employs an
insider ownership ratio in which the denominator is the percentage of votes necessary
to prevent a takeover and the numerator is the percentage o f votes controlled by
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management. Though the results o f essay two can not be specifically applied to support
the value of this ratio (in terms o f finance research), the intuitive application is obvious.
The third improvement over prior research is the incorporation o f a firm ’s pre- and
/wwf-announcement level of managerial voting power.

In contrast, prior research

typically concentrates on the pre-announcement level o f ownership.

The post

announcement level is critical, however, because it is the dominant factor in the
determination as to whether managers have the necessary votes to entrench themselves.
The difference in the predicted effects is particularly evident for firms with an initially
low level of managerial voting power that is increased (by the ESOP) to a level of
entrenchment. Prior research typically predicts a positive effect because it focuses on
the "low" pre-announcement level o f voting power. Conversely, essay two predicts a
negative market reaction because the post-announcement level o f managerial voting
power is sufficient to veto all hostile takeover attempts. The results support this latter
contention with the significant negative effect found for attractive firms announcing an
ESOP that increases the level o f managerial voting power (as proxied by the insider
ownership ratio) from low to high. Furthermore, in support o f the contention that the
market discriminates between firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover,
insignificant results were noted for the "low-high" unattractive firms.
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Chapter 5
Essay Three: Insider Trading

5.1. Introduction
Essay three examines the trading activities o f managers ("insiders") in the stock of
their firm around the announcement o f an ESOP. The analysis is partitioned to address
two general questions. First, is there a relationship between the structure o f the ESOP
(and the resulting stock price reaction) and the insiders’ trading activities? Second,
based on the assumption that ESOPs increase a firm’s managerial voting power, does
management see this as an opportunity to reduce their personal (cash-flow) ownership,
yet still maintain a sufficient level of voting power (entrenchment)?
Given the relatively consistent market reactions to various security-related
announcements,39 managers are afforded the opportunity to exploit their private
information by adjusting their insider trading around the announcement. Despite the
threat o f SEC-imposed penalties, significant insider trading activity prior to securities
issuance announcements has been noted in several empirical examinations.

For

example, Karpoff and Lee (1991) find a significant level o f insider sales prior to the
announcements o f common stock and convertible debt offerings.

The initial

presumption is that the insiders are reducing their cash-flow ownership prior to the
release o f negative news to prevent a drop in personal wealth.

Similarly, Lee,

Mikkelson, and Partch (1989) find a systematic increase in net insider purchases prior
to the announcement o f a tender offer repurchase, an announcement typically associated

39For example, the m arket’s reaction to a non-ESOP common stock issuance (repurchase)
announcement is typically negative (positive)(Smith, 1986).

106
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with a stock price increase. The findings suggest that managers use private information
about the forthcoming announcement to enhance their personal wealth.
In a similar fashion, one purpose o f this essay is to focus on the securities issuance
structure o f the ESOP and analyze the level of insider trading activity in the pre- and
post-announcement periods. The preservation and enhancement o f insiders’ wealth is
analyzed by associating their net trading activity with the cumulative prediction errors
noted in section 3.4, Tables 5 and 6. Furthermore, assuming that abnormal insider
trading activity is a proxy for private information (John and Mishra, 1990), the results
are additional evidence o f the reasonableness of the asymmetric information arguments
discussed in essay one.

Supportive examples would be announcements with a

significant level o f net insider sell-offs prior to ESOPs structured with convertible
preferred shares, and net insider purchases prior to announcements of repurchased
equity ESOPs. The sell-off (purchase) infers to the market that the stock is overpriced
(underpriced), an inference consistent with the asymmetric information arguments.
This essay also examines the interactions between an ESOP’s effect on managerial
voting power and the insider trading activities surrounding the announcement.

It is

hypothesized that the ESOP-related effects will differ from those o f a comparable nonESOP securities issuance announcement. For example, a significant insider sell-off and
a subsequent non-ESOP issue o f common stock40 will always reduce the level of
managerial voting power. The reduction is caused by a decrease in shares owned by
management and an increase in shares outstanding. Management concerned with their

“T h i s scenario is consistent with the findings o f K arpoff and Lee (1991).
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level o f voting power (for entrenchment purposes) may, therefore, be impelled to
reduce the level o f personal shares sold to prevent a significant decrease in voting
power.
In comparison, given the assumption that the ESOP shares are aligned with
management, an insider sell-off and ESOP-related common stock issuance can actually
result in an increase in managerial voting power. That is, even though the manager’s
personal ownership is reduced, the number of shares they control (personal ownership
plus ESOP shares) may increase.

The additional voting power, therefore, provides

management with an opportunity to alter its trading patterns.
In effect, a comparison o f ESOP and non-ESOP insider trading activities would
provide indirect information about the market for corporate control and insider voting
power. An ESOP firms’ insiders should have greater flexibility in their trading activity
because o f the aligned votes provided by the ESOP formation.

Because the ESOP

firm s’ managers can maintain or increase their corporate control despite a sell-off of
personal shares, the optimal level o f managerial shares sold is effectively expanded.
In contrast, non-ESOP managers concerned with their level o f voting power do not have
this additional flexibility and, therefore, must reduce the level o f their personal equity
sell-off.
Furthermore, the "attractive-firm" theory examined in essay two hypothesizes that
the corporate control effects on insider trading differ for attractive and unattractive
firms.

It is argued that managers of unattractive firms are able to sell a greater

percentage of their shares than managers of attractive firms because of their firm ’s low
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takeover probability. An example supportive of the attractive-firm theory is the finding
o f a(n) significant (insignificant) insider sell-off prior to an ESOP announced by an
unattractive (attractive) firm. In other words, despite the opportunity to preserve their
wealth, the managers o f attractive firms will retain their shares to maintain or increase
their level o f voting power.

It should be noted, however, that these "flexibility"

arguments assume that the insiders are relatively undeterred by the SEC insider trading
penalties.

5.1.1. Insider Trading and the Structure of ESOPs
Despite the fact that the Securities and Exchange Act o f 1934 considers it illegal
to trade on (profit from) private information, previous research has consistently shown
that insiders such as officers and directors earn significant returns from the trades in
the stock o f their firm (e.g., Jaffe, 1974, Finnerty, 1976, and Seyhun, 1986). The
findings suggest that there is intensive (abnormal) insider buying activity prior to
favorable stock price movements and abnormal selling activity prior to unfavorable
price movements.
Evidence associating insider trades with firm-specific press releases is also sizable.
Significant profitable insider trading activity is noted prior to earnings announcements
(Penman, 1982), securities issuance announcements (Karpoff and Lee, 1991), tender
offer repurchase announcements (Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch, 1989), and LBOs
(Harlow and Howe, 1993). Givoly and Palmon (1985) find an insignificant correlation
between a firm ’s insider trades and a subsequent material press release (e.g., earnings
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announcements), but note that the stock price tends to increase (decrease) in months
subsequent to intensive insider buying (selling) activities.
Though numerous studies support the connection between irregular insider trading
activities and firm-specific announcements, the research of interest to essay three relates
to the trades made by insiders prior to security-related announcements. In particular,
Karpoff and Lee (1991) and Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1989) provide indirect
evidence in support o f the hypothesis that the securities issuance structure o f the ESOP
has a material effect on the trades made by management. Providing direct evidence of
the association between the ESOP structure and insider trading activities is one purpose
o f this essay.
Karpoff and Lee examine the volume of insider trades transacted in the months
surrounding the announcement o f common stock, convertible debt, and straight debt
issues.

Because insider trading research and the asymmetric information hypothesis

commonly assume that management is privy to critical information about the true value
o f the firm, an integration o f these research areas, as they relate to the securities
issuance process, is appropriate. For example, Myers and M ajluf s (1984) asymmetric
information hypothesis contends that a primary offering of common stock implies that
management believes that their firm’s equity is overvalued, and is the basis o f the
predicted negative market reaction when the issuance is announced (Asquith and
Mullins, 1986, Masulis and Korwar, 1986, and Mikkelson and Partch, 1986).
Assuming that management is privy to the forthcoming announcement and is aware of
the typical negative market reaction, and given the assumption that investors (including
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Ill
insiders) are wealth-maximizing individuals, it is logical to conclude that management
may use their inside information to preserve their personal wealth.

Thus, it is

hypothesized that a "preservation of wealth" objective leads management to sell their
equity prior to the (negative) announcement. Karpoff and Lee support this argument
with their finding of a significant level o f net selling activity prior to the announcements
o f common stock issuances.
A similar insider trading/asymmetric information association holds for convertible
debt offerings. The asymmetric information hypothesis contends that a convertible debt
issuance announcement suggests to the market that management possesses private
negative information about the underlying equity. The overall effect is a downward
revaluation o f the firm ’s equity by the market (Linn and Pinegar, 1985, and Mikkelson
and Partch, 1986).

Once again, it is hypothesized that management will attempt to

preserve their wealth by selling their personal equity prior to the convertible debt
announcement.

Karpoff and Lee support this contention with their finding o f a

significant level o f insider equity sell-offs in the months preceding the announcement.
Finally, Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch’s (1989) analysis of insider trading activity
around the announcement o f a tender offer repurchase also supports the insider
trading/asymmetric information connection. The asymmetric information hypothesis
suggests that tender offer repurchases are motivated by management’s belief that the
stock is greatly undervalued. The inference typically results in a significant stock price
increase on the day o f the announcement (Dann, 1981, and Vermaelen, 1981).

In

relation to insider trading and the assumption o f maximizing an investor’s personal
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wealth, a significant level o f insider equity purchases prior to the announcement is
predicted and observed by Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch.
In sum, there is substantial support for the argument that managers take advantage
o f their inside information when buying and selling their personal equity holdings in the
months surrounding a non-ESOP securities issuance announcement.

Given the

significance o f the ESOP’s securities issuance structure on shareholder wealth (essay
one), and based on the non-ESOP insider trading research noted above, one purpose of
essay three is to directly test for the association between the asymmetric information
hypothesis and the level of insider trading around the ESOP announcement.
A second, closely related, purpose is to provide support for the contention that an
insider’s goal o f wealth maximization affects the trading activities around a material
(ESOP) announcement. The specific hypothesis associated with this last contention is
that managers will have significant net purchases (sell-offs) prior to the announcement
o f ESOPs associated with significant positive (negative) prediction errors.

Such

findings are also consistent with John and Mishra (1990), who contend that insider
trading and the firm ’s announcement are used as a joint signal to disseminate
information to the market.

5.1.2. Takeover Attractiveness, Voting Power, and Insider Trading
Essay three also examines the effects of a firm’s managerial voting power and
takeover attractiveness on the insider trades transacted in the immediate months
surrounding an ESOP announcement. The connection between ESOPs and changes in
managerial voting power surrounding the announcement was first presented by Chang
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and Mayers (1992), but analyzed with less statistical rigor than the research conducted
here. Chang and Mayers first attempt to explain the negative coefficient o f the "ESOP
size/insider ownership" interaction variable41 attached to firms with prior insider
ownership in excess o f 40 percent. They argue that ESOPs announced by these firms
are signals o f a subsequent sell-off of insider-owned shares. The sell-off translates into
an increase in agency costs caused by the reduced alignment o f interests between
management and the shareholders. Furthermore, even though managers of the "40+ %"
firms are decreasing their personal (cash-flow) ownership, the overall level of
managerial voting control (entrenchment) is unaffected because of the increase in
management-aligned ESOP shares.

Thus, a decrease in the alignment o f interests

without a lowering o f entrenchment results in a decrease in firm value.

A similar

argument is presented by Mikkelson and Partch (1993) in their analysis o f the post
performance of ESOP firms.
It should also be noted that ESOPs described in this manner are quite similar to
dual-class recapitalizations. In particular, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) analyze the dual
class restructurings o f 94 firms (1976-1986) in which shareholders were given the
opportunity to receive a newly created, limited voting rights stock in exchange for their
"high-vote"

shares o f equity.

Even though the shareholders approved

the

restructurings, the sample of recapitalization announcements exhibited a significant
negative market reaction.42 The similarity with ESOPs pertains to the fact that the

“"Chang and M ayers’ regression is described in section 4.1.2.
42Partch (1987) finds non-negutive price reactions to the 44 recapitalization announcements made
between 1962 and 1984.
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managers are given the opportunity to increase their high vote/low-cash-flow shares and
decrease their ownership o f low vote/high-cash-flow equity.

ESOPs and dual-class

recapitalizations, therefore, allow management the opportunity to retain their voting
control, yet reduce their cash-flow ownership.

A final similarity is the finding by

Jarrell and Poulsen that the negative prediction errors are larger for firms with a high
level o f insider ownership prior to the announcement.

One important difference

between the two events, however, is the fact that the high vote/low-cash-flow shares
are costly to the insider (i.e., the shares must be purchased or exchanged for value),
while ESOP shares effectively increase the insiders’ voting power with no direct cost
to the managers.
Returning to the Chang and Mayers "4 0 + " contention, general support for their
argument involves a pre- and post-ESOP comparison o f insider ownership, where
ownership is calculated as a percentage o f total shares outstanding.

For the "40+

percent" category of analyzed ESOPs (sample size = 13), an average decrease in
insider ownership of 14.8 percent, and an average increase in ESOP ownership o f 11.9
percent, is calculated by the authors.

This result suggests that a sizable sell-off of

insider shares has occurred. Given the mathematics o f the analysis, and the presence
o f a few extreme percentages, the results are likely to be misleading, however. For
example, a firm with a pre-announcement insider ownership (pre-IO) level o f 50
percent that established a common stock ESOP of 30 percent43 would experience a 12
percent drop in insider ownership without the sale o f a single insider share.

With

43That is, the number o f shares outstanding is increased by 30 percent.
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respect to the "extreme percentages", four of the 13 firms experience a drop in insider
ownership in excess of 30 percent, events that undoubtedly have a significant effect on
the overall results.
The termination o f a manager may also cause a large decrease in the level of
insider ownership. As noted by Mikkelson and Partch, 20 o f the 52 (38 percent) ESOP
firms examined by the authors replaced their CEO within three years o f the
announcement. To be relevant to this argument, however, the termination must occur
between Chang and M ayers’ pre- and post-announcement dates, a plausible event given
the fact that their "post" percentage data were gathered from the second proxy statement
subsequent to the ESOP announcement. To improve on the generalities and potentially
incorrect inferences of previous research, this essay performs a direct examination of
the actual insider trading activities.
It should finally be noted that Chang and Mayers also analyze the relation between
the percentage change in insider ownership (in addition to their 20-plus other
explanatory variables) and the announcement’s prediction error. For firms with a preIO level in excess o f 40 percent, they find a weakly significant relationship between the
percentage change in insider ownership and the prediction error. Their results suggest
that the larger the decrease in insider ownership, the more negative the response to the
announced ESOP. This, however, implicitly assumes that the market is aware of the
magnitude of the change in insider ownership at the time o f the ESOP announcement.
Given the three-year period used to calculate the change in insider ownership, this
statistical relationship may be spurious. In other words, if the insider sell-off occurs
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subsequent to the ESOP announcement (i.e., it is an action unknown to the market at
the time of the ESOP announcement), why should there be a relationship between the
prediction error and the magnitude o f the change in insider ownership?
To test the validity o f this critical assumption, this essay examines the relation
between the ESOP-related prediction error and the actual level o f insider trading
activity transacted prior to the announcement.

In sum, essay three analyses the

relationships between insider trading activity, voting power, and a firm ’s takeover
attractiveness by directly examining the trading activities.

5.2. Hypotheses
The first part o f this essay three examines the interactions between the securities
issuance structure o f an ESOP and the insider trades transacted in the immediate months
surrounding the announcement.

Consistent with the non-ESOP findings of Lee,

Mikkelson, and Partch (1989), the first hypothesis o f essay three is as follows:
12)

For ESOPs structured with repurchased equity, significant insider purchases are

predicted in the period preceding the announcement.
Based on the asymmetric information argument that the market will react positively
to the simultaneous repurchase announcement, and given the belief that an insider’s goal
is to maximize his/her personal wealth, the hypothesis suggests that management will
increase its personal ownership prior to the release o f the positive information.
In contrast, because the revised asymmetric information hypothesis (section 3.1.2)
predicts a significant negative market reaction to ESOPs structured with convertible
preferred equity, the goal of wealth maximization implies the following:
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13) Insiders will significantly increase the level of personal sales in the period prior
to an announced ESOP structured with convertible preferred equity.
In general, the goal of wealth maximization would suggest that insiders will alter
their trading patterns around all announcements (e.g., ESOPs) that have a significant
effect on firm value. In particular:
14) Insiders will engage in a significant level of net purchases (sales) prior to the
announcement of ESOPs associated with significant positive (negative) shareholder
wealth effects.
By including the argument that managers o f "attractive" firms will want to maintain
or increase the level o f managerial voting power, it is further argued that the preceding
hypotheses only apply to firms that are unattractive for takeover. To be specific:
15) The effects predicted in hypotheses 13) and 14) are only significant for firms that
are unattractive for takeover.
Finally, the revised asymmetric information hypothesis contends that ESOPs
structured with previously unissued common stock will have a non-negative effect on
shareholder wealth. Combined with the contention that managers are concerned with
maximizing personal wealth, the following hypothesis is formed:
16) ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock will have no effect on
the trading strategies o f insiders in the shares of their firm.

5.3. Data and Method of Analysis
Essay three examines the trading activity of managers in the stock o f their firm
around the announcement o f the establishment and expansion o f an ESOP. The initial
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sample o f ESOP firms analyzed within is identical to the 319 ESOP firms examined in
the first essay. O f these, the 65 announced outside the July 1986 - May 1992 period
are excluded due to unavailability o f insider trading data.
The Securities and Exchange Act o f 1934 requires the timely filing o f all trading
activity by corporate officers, directors, and holders o f more than ten percent o f a given
security (i.e., a blockholder).

The trade must be filed before the tenth day o f the

following month and is documented in the SEC’s Ownership Reporting System (ORS)
data files, the source o f this essay’s data.

In order to concentrate on the managers’

(insiders’) trading activities, only open market purchases and sales made by the firms’
officers and directors are examined in essay three. Trades o f outside blockholders and
amended, inconsistent, or late filings are excluded from the sample.
In general terms, essay three compares the firms’ average insider trading activities
in the event-period (bounded by the 24 months surrounding the announcement)44 to
those transacted during the estimation-period (consisting of all months outside the 24month event-period boundary). The means o f three trading activity measures (defined
in the following paragraph) are calculated for each event-window and estimation-period,
and a two-sample difference-of-means test is used to examine the various hypotheses
o f abnormal insider trading activity around the ESOP announcement. For example,
when analyzing ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock, a finding that the

■“ Based on methods sim ilar to Boehmer (1991), essay three examines the average trading activity in
the following event windows: (-12 months, 0), (-6 months, 0), and (0, + 6 months), where 0 denotes the
day o f the ESOP announcement and months are measured relative to that day. Because the number o f
ESOP firms with trading activity in these three event periods may differ, the average estimation-period
activity may also differ across event-window periods.
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average number o f net insider sales in the (-6, 0) event window is significantly larger
than the average number o f net sales in the estimation period is supportive o f the
revised asymmetric information hypothesis.
The three measures o f trading activity calculated from the ORS data and used in this
analysis are: 1) the net number of shares purchased; 2) the net dollar value o f shares
purchased; and 3) the proportion o f trades in the period which are purchases. The third
measure ranges from zero to one, with a mean in excess o f .5 indicating a period of
time in which the number o f insider purchases exceeds the number o f insider sales.
The means of the first two measures range from negative to positive infinity, with
negative values indicating a larger number o f shares and dollar value o f shares,
respectively, sold than bought.
To test for significantly different means between the estimation- and event-period
measures (i.e., testing for abnormal insider trading around the announcement), a
binomial distribution is assumed for the third measure, and a continuous distribution for
the first and second. Given the additional assumption that the estimation- and eventperiod measures are normally distributed, a standard t-test is employed to test the
hypothesis that the means of the event- and estimation-period measures are equal. In
order to avoid these distributional assumptions, a non-para metric test statistic is also
calculated, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistic, to test the hypothesis that the
estimation- and event-period data are drawn from the same population.
Three sets of tables are constructed to detail the results relevant to: 1) the
asymmetric information hypotheses stated in the first essay; 2) the attractive/unattractive
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arguments o f essay two; and 3) the preservation (or enhancement) o f personal wealth
(essay three). The information in these tables also provides cursory evidence about the
deterrent effects o f the SEC insider trading penalties.
The first set of tables (Tables 26-31) analyzes the insider trading activities
stratified by ESOP structure (as in essay one). The second set (Tables 32-37) examines
the relationship between the trading activities around the ESOP announcement and the
sign of the prediction error. And the third set (Tables 38-43) provides the results of
insider trades stratified by takeover attractiveness.
In sum, essay three analyzes the ESOP firms’ insider trading activities within the
type/source/use and presence/absence of takeover frameworks previously described in
essay one. In combination with the assumption that ESOPs allow managers to maintain
voting control yet reduce their cash-flow ownership, the predicted results are as
follows. ESOP announcements that typically produce a positive market reaction (e.g.,
ESOPs structured with repurchased equity) are associated with abnormal net purchasing
activity prior to the ESOP announcement. Conversely, negative ESOP announcements
(e.g., ESOP/convertible preferred issues) should be preceded by an abnormal level of
insider sales. It is further hypothesized that the sell-off is not significant for firms that
are attractive for takeover.
Essay three also examines the trading activity prior to an ESOP established in the
presence o f a takeover. Though ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity
typically create a negative market reaction, it seems unlikely that a significant level of
net insider sales are transacted around the announcement.

The reduced sales are
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predicted because management will want to preserve its percentage o f "entrenchment"
votes. This prediction is also consistent with the "attractive" hypothesis o f essay two,
which suggests that insider sell-offs are significantly smaller for attractive firms.
Finally, essay three analyzes the relation between the ESOP announcement’s
prediction error and the magnitude o f the insider’s net selling activity prior to the
announcement. An inverse relationship is supportive of the "preservation of insider
wealth" hypothesis and suggests that the SEC trading penalties are somewhat
ineffective.

For example, it is hypothesized that a significant level o f sell-offs are

found prior to ESOP announcements that experience a significant negative market
reaction. This relationship is also consistent with John and Mishra (1990), who contend
that the insider trading and firm announcement are jointly used by the market to infer
information in a more efficient manner.

5.4. Results
Two separate methods are employed to produce the following results. Tables 2931, 35-37, and 41-43 are created by examining the firms’ individual insider trades as
a whole. For example, the mean o f all individual insider trades made in the (-6, 0)
event-period, regardless offirm , is used in the difference-of-means testing procedures.
In contrast, Tables 26-28, 32-34, and 38-40 are the result o f first calculating the
average value o f each firm’s insider trading activity, then calculating the mean o f all
the firms’ averages. The purpose o f the second method o f analysis is to prevent the
possibility that the results are dominated by a greater level of trading activity by
managers o f a small number o f firms. Based on this latter contention, the following
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Table 26
Net Number o f Shares Purchased (Mean o f the firms’ averages).
E S O P STR U C T U R E

(-12,0)

(0 ,+ 6 )

NonTakeover

-1207
.159
.044

-2071

-978
.091
.008

-2068

-750
.034
.002

-1977

Takeover

-372
.552
.452

-959

-68
.543
.295

-1001

-1410
.750
.894

-896

N on-Tkvr
Repurch

-1375
.159
.021

-2497

-1152 -2497
.111
.005

-637
.005
.002

-2336

Non-Tkvr
Non-Repurch

-751
.583
.656

1173

-513
.376
.490

-1003
.854
.256

-1247

N on-Tkvr
CS
Repurch

-819
.023
.038

-3456

-1126 -3456
.063
.045

89
.005
.005

-3456

Non-Tkvr
CS
Non-Repurch

-921
.495
.781

-381

-627
.799
.520

-1873
.497
.263

-509

N on-Tkvr
CPS
Repurch

-1438
.798
.628

-1301

-1384 -1301
.885
.999

-921
.449
.151

-1301

Non-Tkvr
CPS
Non-Repurch

-1290
.967
.798

-1371

-1469 -1371
.959
.396

-1740
.854
.798

-1371

(-6,0)

-1181

-423

N ote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean, t statistic
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value. The second column is the estimation period’s mean.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
CPS = ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
Non-Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
In terp reta tio n : (first column, first row) During the 12-month period prior to the ESOP
announcement, the mean num ber o f shares sold by the manager (on a given trade) was 1,207.
Compared to the average o f 2,071 shares sold by insiders during the estimation period, there is a
. 159 (.044) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means
t-test (W ilcoxon rank-sum test).
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Table 27
Net Dollar Value o f Shares Purchased (Mean o f the firms’ averages).
ESO P
S TR U C TU R E

(-12,0)

NonTakeover

-41265
.118
.030

-65449

-43707
.281
.005

-65438

-29154
.019
.001

Takeover

-5327
.069
.245

-48395

19209
.198
.209

-47715

-109448 -42383
.381
.812

N on-Tkvr
Repurch

-49806
.196
.032

-74893

-54775
.456
.007

-74893

-24474
.005
.002

-72620

N on-Tkvr
Non-Repurch

-20541
.229
.352

-43968

-15000
.122
.296

-44397

-39714
.847
.144

-45527

Non-Tkvr
CS
Repurch

-33719
.099
.046

-96525

-46738
.227
.067

-96525

-13577
.024
.006

-96525

N on-Tkvr
CS
Non-Repurch

-14579
.832
.538

-17519

-7891
.389
.393

-19228

-49495
.489
.201

-20221

N on-Tkvr
CPS
Repurch

-66226
.908
.556

-63875

-66956
.892
.341

-63875

-56514
.759
.119

-63875

Non-Tkvr
CPS
Non-Repurch

-61853
.527
.798

-121026

-68053
.569
.999

-121026

-79348
.661
.798

-121026

(0, + 6)

(-6,0)

-64267

N ote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean, t statistic
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
CPS = ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
N on-Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
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Table 28
Percentage o f Purchases (Mean o f the firms’ percentages).
E SO P
STR U C T U R E

(-12,0)

(-6,0)

NonTakeover

.489
.957
.878

.492

.482
.883
.746

.489

.549
.221
.189

.487

Takeover

.539
.461
.426

.472

.544
.517
.514

.481

.451
.704
.699

.485

N on-Tkvr
Repurch

.461
.553
.736

.430

.456
.652
.987

.430

.501
.254
.462

.432

Non-Tkvr
Non-Repurch

.562
.463
.788

.622

.558
.509
.729

.613

.664
.473
.152

.605

N on-Tkvr
CS
Repurch

.431
.419
.534

.350

.385
.749
.784

.350

.596
.029
.076

.350

N on-Tkvr
CS
Non-Repurch

.613
.621
.855

.664

.617
.774
.929

.646

.750
.273
.054

.635

N on-Tkvr
CPS
Repurch

.367
.996
.516

.367

.389
.827
.664

.367

.416
.619
.977

.367

Non-Tkvr
CPS
Non-Repurch

.322
.381
.639

.463

.354
.499
.684

.466

.360
.552
.563

.463

(0 .+ 6 )

N ote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event p eriod's mean, t statistic
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
CPS = ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
N on-Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
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Table 29
Net Number o f Shares Purchased.
ESO P
STRUCTURE

(-12,0)

NonTakeover

-2145
.016
.057

-3223

-1517
.001
.018

-3217

-732
.000
.004

-2445

Takeover

-1240
.552
.002

-996

-827
.752
.756

-1025

4828
.081
.009

-834

Non-Tkvr
Repurch

-2699
.041
.002

-3913

-1810
.001
.000

-3913

-856
.000
.031

-2861

N on-Tkvr
Non-Repurch

-850
.328
.001

-1243

-899
.524
.001

-1248

-356
.050
.056

-1296

N on-Tkvr
CS
Repurch

-1882
.058
.001

-5724

-1680
.057
.000

-5724

-934
.002
.001

-5724

N on-Tkvr
CS
Non-Repurch

-1805
.239
.079

-592

-1834
.451
.439

-629

-524
.793
.040

-737

N on-Tkvr
CPS
Repurch

-1273
.387
.000

-1506

-1346
.627
.003

-1506

-1402 -1506
.788
.428

N on-Tkvr
CPS
Non-Repurch

-2583
.763
.963

-2970

-2886
.965
.989

-2970

-1442 -2970
.134
.158

(-6,0)

<0, + 6)

N ote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event p eriod's mean, t statistic
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
CPS = ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
N on-Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126

Table 30
Net Dollar Value o f Shares Purchased.
E SO P
STR U C T U R E

(-12,0)

NonTakeover

-74393
.009
.020

-108793

-66133
.004
.005

-108618

-45304
.000
.008

-99544

Takeover

-53370
.186
.002

-72140

-30760
.049
.849

-71292

-79086
.842
.004

-60623

N on-Tkvr
Repurch

-96450
.037
.001

-133234

-87449
.023
.000

-133234

-50074
.000
.015

-121263

N on-Tkvr
Non-Repurch

-22903
.073
.003

-38481

-21644
.091
.001

-38855

-30568
.476
.121

-39582

N on-Tkvr
CS
Repurch

-83230
.084
.001

-197571

-84989
.110
.000

-197571

-26342
.000
.001

-197571

N on-Tkvr
CS
Non-Repurch

-38258
.269
.219

-23559

-32393
.676
.432

-25156

-37634
.562
.536

-26557

Non-Tkvr
CPS
Repurch

-72265
.933
.001

-73199

-71944
.923
.019

-73199

-95733
.309
.504

-73199

Non-Tkvr
CPS
Non-Repurch

-118129 -141410
.701
.759

-71225
.171
.118

-141410

(-6,0)

(0. + 6)

-137455 -141410
.967
.861

Vote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean, t statistic
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
CPS = ESOPs structured w ith convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
N on-Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
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Table 31
Percentage o f Purchases.
ESO P
S TR U C TU R E

(-12,0)

NonTakeover

.495
.943
.943

.496

.483
.551
.551

.496

.522
.557
.556

.509

Takeover

.311
.000
.000

.454

.463
.964
.963

.461

.562
.029
.030

.468

Non-Tkvr
Repurch

.451
.089
.085

.419

.463
.061
.061

.419

.462
.335
.345

.437

N on-Tkvr
Non-Repurch

.599
.001
.001

.717

.500
.001
.001

.454

.699
.869
.869

.705

Non-Tkvr
CS
Repurch

.363
.248
.249

.317

.396
.102
.102

.317

.539
.000
.000

.317

Non-Tkvr
CS
Non-Repurch

.521
.064
.064

.616

.523
.246
.246

.599

.677
.160
.161

.584

N on-Tkvr
CPS
Repurch

.522
.001
.001

.424

.534
.005
.005

.424

.419
.914
.914

.424

N on-Tkvr
CPS
Non-Repurch

.314
.879
.881

.328

.333
.962
.965

.328

.429
.315
.315

.328

(-6,0)

(0 .+ 6 )

Vote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period's mean, t statistic
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
CPS = ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
Non-Tkvr = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
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Table 32
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Net Number of Shares Purchased (Mean of
the firm s’ averages).
ESO P
STRUCTURE

(-12,0)

Positive PEs

-723
.078
.087

-2941

-527
.062
.025

-2941

-698
.033
.049

-2941

Negative PEs

-1133
.615
.640

-2019

-1433
.764
.726

-2019

-1443
.888
.661

-1786

(0,4-6)

(-6,0)

p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03.
Negative P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
In te rp re ta tio n : (first column, first row) During the 12-month period prior to the ESOP
announcement, the average num ber o f shares sold by the manager (on a given trade) was 723.
Compared to the average o f 2,941 shares sold by insiders during the estimation period, there is a
.078 (.087) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means
t-test (W ilcoxon rank-sum test).

Table 33
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Net Dollar Value o f Shares Purchased (Mean
o f the firm s’ averages).
ESO P
ST R U C T U R E

(-12,0)

Positive PEs

-46829
.583
.262

-66447

-41686
.505
.070

-66447

-20396
.117
.118

-66447

Negative PEs

-26493
.501
.686

-42541

-32324
.607
.941

-45241

-33021
.948
.964

-35569

(-6,0)

(0,4-6)

p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03.
Negative P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
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Table 34
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Percentage o f Purchases (Mean of the firms’
percentages).
ESO P
S TR U C TU R E

(-12,0)

Positive PEs

.440
.556
.798

.388

.456
.463
.812

.388

.567
.075
.166

.388

Negative PEs

.504
.771
.959

.541

.591
.745
.475

.541

.552
.880
.999

.545

(-6,0)

(0 ,+ 6 )

Sote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean, t statistic
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03.
Negative P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.

Table 35
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Net Number of Shares Purchased.
E SO P
S TR U C TU R E

(-12,0)

Positive PEs

-2310
.026
.024

-4462

-2391
.086
.235

-4462

-1388
.000
.013

-4462

Negative PEs

-1439
.292
.031

-620

-389
.808
.936

-620

-694
.404
.116

44

(-6,0)

(0. + 6)

N ote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are t le event period’s mean, t
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column w ithin each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s = all ESOP firm s that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03.
Negative P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
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Table 36
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Net Dollar Value of Shares Purchased.
ESO P
STRUCTURE

(-12,0)

Positive PEs

-104799
.014
.095

-179774

-112540
.052
.448

-179774

-40357
.000
.026

-179774

Negative PEs

-32171
.409
.089

-21306

-16211
.727
.782

-21306

-24868
.102
.317

11663

(0 ,+ 6 )

(-6,0)

p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03.
Negative P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.

Table 37
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Percentage o f Purchases.
ESO P
ST R U C T U R E

(-12,0)

Positive PEs

.409
.069
.069

.350

.356
.882
.882

.350

.454
.028
.028

.350

Negative PEs

.508
.151
.151

.613

.714
.304
.303

.613

.538
.339
.339

.619

(-6,0)

(0, + 6)

Vote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are t le event period’s mean, t
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03.
Negative P E ’s = all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
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Table 38
Attractive/Unattractive: Net Number of Shares Purchased (Mean o f the firms’
averages).
ESO P
ST R U C T U R E

(-12,0)

(0, + 6)

Attractive

-1350
.218
.105

-2338

-1384
.471
.087

-2328

-1221
.181
.239

-2328

Unattractive

-2283
.975
.948

-2233

-1251
.464
.489

-2233

-1759
.945
.168

-1887

(-6,0)

p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
In te rp re ta tio n : (first column, first row) During the 12-month period prior to the ESOP
announcement, the average num ber o f shares sold by the manager (on a given trade) was 1,350.
Compared to the average o f 2,338 shares sold by insiders during the estimation period, there is a
.218 (. 105) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means
t-test (W ilcoxon rank-sum test).

Table 39
Attractive/Unattractive: Net Dollar Value of Shares Purchased (Mean o f the firms’
averages).
ESO P
ST R U C T U R E

(-12,0)

Attractive

-41100
.096
.052

-80455

-46029
.467
.070

-80280

-50491
.157
.221

-80280

Unattractive

-45941
.880
.996

-49482

-30518
.354
.483

-49482

-42419
.995
.272

-44755

(-6,0)

<0,+6)

p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
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Table 40
Attractive/Unattractive: Percentage o f Purchases (Mean o f the firm s’ percentages).
E SO P
S TR U C TU R E

(-12,0)

(0 ,+ 6 )

Attractive

.497
.290
.364

.437

.502
.299
.397

.407

.477
.483
.917

.434

Unattractive

.446
.441
.384

.509

.475
.690
.707

.509

.564
.605
.431

.518

(-6,0)

p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column w ithin each box is the estimation period’s mean.

Table 41
Attractive/Unattractive: Net Number o f Shares Purchased.
E SO P
S TR U C TU R E

(-12,0)

(-6,0)

Attractive

-3247
.851
.090

-3385

-2522
.363
.777

-3234

-676
.001
.010

-3234

Unattractive

-1819
.029
.743

-3655

-1399
.005
.974

-3655

-780
.075
.003

-1582

(0 ,+ 6 )

Vote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean,
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column w ithin each box is the estimation period’s mean.
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Table 42
Attractive/Unattractive: Net Dollar Value o f Shares Purchased.
ESO P
ST R U C T U R E

(-12,0)

Attractive

-117809
.001
.083

Unattractive

-43173
.000
.606

(-6,0)

(0, + 6)

-141632

-103940 -141042
.179
.346

-61491
.000
.005

-141042

-79127

-35569
.000
.921

-19159
.002
.013

-52214

-79127

p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.

Table 43
Attractive/Unattractive: Percentage o f Purchases.
ESO P
STR U C T U R E

(-12,0)

Attractive

.312
.003
.003

.371

.368
.902
.902

.371

.455
.005
.005

.371

Unattractive

.489
.059
.059

.536

.462
.017
.019

.536

.636
.346
.347

.598

(-6,0)

(0 ,+ 6 )

N ote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean
p-value, and W ilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
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discussion o f results will concentrate on Tables 26-28, 32-34, and 38-40. Furthermore,
given the essay’s focus on insider ownership (e.g., the net number o f insider shares
traded) and wealth maximization (e.g., the net dollar value o f insider shares traded),
the discussion will be further limited to Tables 26, 32, and 38 and Tables 27, 33, and
39, respectively.
In relation to an ESOP’s structure and insider trades, the results o f Tables 26 and
27 are consistent. Both tables show that non-takeover ESOPs, ESOPs structured with
repurchased equity (in the absence of takeover activity), and common stock ESOPs
structured with repurchased equity demonstrate a level o f insider sales that is
significantly lower than average in the twelve months before, and six months after, the
announcement.45 Given the fact that significant insider purchases are conspicuous to
the scrutiny of SEC review (for insider trading compliance), a significant reduction in
shares sold is a more rational and expected result for the analysis o f insider trades
around these subsets of ESOP announcements that typically elicit positive market
reactions (essay one).
More important, however, is the finding (comparable to essay one’s results) that
ESOPs structured with repurchased equity have a significant effect on the overall
results. That is, it appears that the significant "non-takeover" insider trading results are

45For example, note the "Non-Tkvr/Repurch" non-parametric P-values o f .021, .005, and .002 (Table
26) and .032, .007, and .002 (Table 26) for the (-12,0), (-6,0), and (0, + 6 ) periods, respectively. These
Table 26 results for the (-12,0) period are interpreted as follows: During the 12-month period prior to
the ESOP announcement, the mean number o f shares sold by the manager (on a given trade) was 1,375.
Compared to the average o f 2,497 shares sold by the insiders during the estimation period, there is a . 149
(.021) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means t-test
(W ilcoxon rank-sum test).
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caused by the sample o f ESOPs structured with repurchased equity. This is noted by
comparing the significance of the reductions in insider sales for the non-takeover/non
repurchase and non-takeover/repurchase categories. Moreover, the "repurchase" effect
is restricted to the category o f ESOPs structured with previously unissued common
stock.

ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock exhibit insignificant

reductions in managerial sell-offs for both repurchase and non-repurchase samples.
In addition to supporting the first essay’s results that ESOPs structured with
repurchased equity have an overriding positive effect on the market, the results
described above are consistent with the asymmetric information arguments (section
3.1.1) and the personal wealth maximization contentions (section 5.1.1). That is, the
insiders’ reduction in sell-offs prior to the ESOP/repurchased equity announcement is
consistent with the asymmetric information argument that the managers believe the
equity is underpriced.

It is also consistent with the contention that management is

maximizing personal wealth by reducing its level of equity sales prior to an
announcement that typically enhances shareholder wealth.
In contrast, the insignificant "convertible preferred" findings (of Tables 26 and 27)
do not support the hypothesis that an increase in insider sales is expected prior to the
predicted significant negative effect on shareholder wealth. The insignificant results for
the takeover sample do, however, support the contention that management will not
significantly reduce their level o f inside ownership even though a material drop in
shareholder wealth is expected on the day o f the ESOP announcement. This argument
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is based on the notion that management will want to preserve their level o f votes for
entrenchment purposes.
In relation to the maximization o f personal wealth arguments, the results o f Tables
32 and 33 support the contention that the level o f insider sales will decrease prior to the
release of significant positive news.

The "positive news" is proxied by ESOP

announcements that have prediction errors in excess of 3 percent, and the Table 32
findings suggest that managers significantly decrease their level o f shares sold around
the announcement.

Conversely, insider trading is insignificantly affected by ESOP

announcements associated with predictions errors below -3 percent (the proxy for
negative news).

True support for the wealth maximization hypothesis would be a

significant sell-off o f shares prior to the negative announcement and price reaction.
Furthermore, support for the argument that managers are using their insider
information to maximize shareholder wealth should actually be judged by the change
in the dollar value of shares sold (Table 33), not the number o f shares sold (Table 32).
In this regard, the evidence is relatively weak. That is, the only support for the wealth
maximization hypothesis is the (-6,0) period’s significant (p-value o f 0.07) reduction
in the dollar value o f insider sales prior to ESOPs experiencing a prediction error in
excess o f 3 percent (Table 33).
Support for the unattractive/attractive hypotheses is also weak. Table 39 provides
slight evidence that managers o f firms that are attractive for takeover will reduce their
level of sales to preserve their entrenchment votes.

The (-12,0) and (-6,0) non-

parametric p-values o f .052 and .070 (respectively) weakly suggest that managers are
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reducing the dollar value o f personal sales prior to ESOP announcements made by firms
that are attractive for takeover. Because "entrenchment" pertains to the level o f votes
(i.e., number of shares owned), not the dollar value o f personal equity, the results of
Table 38 are a more accurate measure o f the attractive/unattractive effects on
shareholder wealth. In this case, the .105 and .087 p-values (for the (-12,0) and (-6,0)
periods) further weaken the support for the argument that managers o f attractive firms
will reduce their level of insider sales around the ESOP announcement. (A superior
test of this hypothesis would involve the analysis o f insider trading activity in the
months surrounding the date when management first realized that their firm was
attractive for takeover, an extremely difficult time to determine.)

5.5. Conclusion
One purpose of this essay is to extend the "ESOP structure" findings of the first
essay into an insider trading framework.

This extension includes the asymmetric

information hypothesis’ key assumption that managers are privy to information pertinent
to the true value o f the firm. The market attempts to infer this private information
from the decisions announced by management, including the securities issuance
structure o f the ESOP. The final step is the revaluation o f the firm after the private
information is inferred from the announcement.
By incorporating the assumption that insiders trade to maximize their personal
wealth, this essay contends that the managers’ trading activities in the stock o f their
firm are affected by those ESOP structures that significantly affect firm value.

In

particular, to enhance personal wealth, it is hypothesized that managers will increase

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138

the level o f shares purchased prior to an announcement that elicits a significant positive
market response. As described in section 5.4. given the scrutiny of the SEC, a more
likely reaction (than an increase in the level of shares purchased) is a reduction in the
level o f shares sold.

Consistent with this contention is the finding that insiders

significantly reduce the level o f personal sales prior to the announcement o f ESOPs
structured with repurchased equity, a structure shown to have a positive effect on
market value (essay one).
Essay three also predicts a larger insider sell-off of shares prior to those ESOP
announcements that typically decrease the value of the firm. This prediction is not
supported by the results. There is an insignificant effect on insider trades in the period
surrounding the announcement o f ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity.
Though a similar insignificant effect on insider trading is found for ESOPs announced
in the presence o f takeover activity, an increase in insider sales is not expected (despite
the hypothesized significant and negative market reaction; essay one) because
management prefers to retain their shares for entrenchment purposes. Though similar
predictions are made for the insider trading activities o f firms that are attractive for
takeover, the findings weakly support the hypothesized attractive/unattractive effects on
insider trading.
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Chapter 6
Summary

6.1. Conclusion
The popularity o f employee stock ownership plans in the mid-to-late 1980s is
frequently attributed to an ESOP’s tax advantage and anti-takeover effectiveness, as
discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.4.

Though the frequency o f ESOP creations has

recently dropped with the downturn in takeover activity and the reduction in ESOP tax
benefits, ESOPs remain a viable employee benefit plan available to management.
Furthermore, given the continuously changing environments affecting the applicable tax
laws and market for corporate control, ESOPs may, once again, become a popular
employee benefit plan.

Thus, a further examination o f ESOPs is warranted to

understand the past, and assist in the future, ESOP-related managerial decisions.
Regardless o f the benefit o f an increased understanding o f ESOPs, this examination
adds to the finance literature in several ways. First, additional support is provided for
the asymmetric information hypothesis as it relates to the securities issuance structure
of the ESOP. Consistent with the asymmetric information argument is the significant
positive (weakly significant and negative) effect on shareholder wealth associated with
the announcement o f an ESOP structured with repurchased equity (convertible preferred
equity). In support o f a revised asymmetric information hypothesis, which contends
that the actions o f management are guided by its concern for the welfare of the firm’s
shareholders and employees, is the finding that ESOPs structured with convertible
preferred equity (and no simultaneous repurchase announcement) have a larger negative

139
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effect on firm value than ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
This finding is exactly opposite to the arguments and results o f previous securities
issuance research.
The most notable finding o f the ESOP/securities issuance analysis, however, is the
overriding positive effect attached to ESOPs structured with repurchased equity. The
results suggest that the significant positive effects associated with most ESOP structures
are solely caused by the presence o f simultaneous repurchase announcement.

For

example, the findings of essay one show that ESOPs structured with common stock and
a simultaneous repurchased equity announcement have a significant and positive effect
on shareholder wealth.

In contrast, common stock ESOPs structured without

repurchased equity experience insignificant wealth effects. Comparable repurchase/non
repurchase results are noted for "non-takeover" ESOPs structured with convertible
preferred equity, leveraged ESOPs, and the overall sample o f ESOPs.
Similarly, the presence o f repurchased equity appears to have a significant effect
on the insider trading activities o f the firm ’s managers around the announcement o f an
ESOP (essay three). In general, no unusual changes in the managers’ trading patterns
are noted except for the sample o f firms announcing an ESOP structured with
repurchased equity. To be specific, a significant reduction in the level of insider sales
is found for firms with an announced ESOP structured with repurchased equity.
Similar structures announced without a simultaneous repurchase announcement have no
significant effect on the managers’ trading patterns. In sum, the overall results suggest
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that the structure of the ESOP (in particular, ESOPs structured with repurchased equity)
has a significant effect on firm value and insider trading activity.
In addition to the findings that suggest the importance o f the ESOP structure chosen
by management, this analysis contributes to the literature with its acknowledgement of
a firm ’s takeover "attractiveness" and supermajority provisions, and their effects on
insider ownership and the market for corporate control. Previous insider ownership
research implicitly assumes that all firms with an identical percentage o f managerial
ownership have an equal probability of being taken over (i.e., they are equally
"attractive"), regardless o f differences in features such as firm-size, leverage, and
growth. Furthermore, prior empirical analyses infer that firms with identical insider
ownership have equal protection against takeover attempts despite the fact that the
firm s’ takeover veto powers may differ by the state of incorporation, and corporate
bylaw, supermajority provisions.
By incorporating these effects into the ESOP/insider ownership analyses, essay two
provides insight into an ESOP’s effect on managerial voting power and its relation with
the change in firm value. In addition, it is shown that these effects differ for ESOP
firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover.

In particular, the findings

suggest that the market reacts negatively to ESOP announcements that increase the level
o f managerial voting power to a level of entrenchment when the firm has characteristics
that make it "attractive for takeover."

Conversely, no significant market reaction is

noted for unattractive firms that have a similar increase in managerial voting power.
Thus, the outcome o f accounting for the firms’ supermajority provisions and
takeover attractiveness is the finding that suggests that the market differentiates between
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firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover. In relation to corporate control
research, the intuitive appeal, and significant findings, of essay two suggest that the
calculation o f a firm ’s managerial voting power should adjust for the differences in
supermajority provisions. Essay two also supports the argument that the analyzed firms
should be partitioned by their level of takeover attractiveness to prevent dilutive results.
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